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[lIngenuity should receive a liberal encouragement.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Under United States patent law, the specification2 of a patent must include "a
written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and
using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled
1. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980) (quoting the author of the Patent Act of 1793,
which embodied Thomas Jefferson's philosophy).
2. See PHMIUPAREEDA & LOUIS KAPLOW, ANTIrTRUST ANALYSIS 158-59 (5th ed. 1997) ("The heart of
[a patent] application is the 'specification,' which describes the purposes and workings of the invention and
'claims' the applicant's particular invention:).
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in the art to which it pertains... to make and use the same."3 Generally, satisfying
the written description requirement does not present a significant obstacle for the
patent applicant.4 However, recent Federal Circuit Court decisions have illustrated
the challenge in establishing claims in biotechnology, particularly in the patenting
of genes such as DNA sequences and other genetically engineered products.5
The development of modem biotechnology 6 "has experienced exponential
growth' 7 since the discovery of the double-helical structure of DNA over forty-five
years ago.' As a result of this "unprecedented expansion of knowledge," scientific
research has incurred significant financial expenditures. ° Furthermore, with the
increase in the number of biotechnological inventions being transformed into
marketable products,'commercial conflicts have arisen over the ownership and use
of these new scientific discoveries. However, it was not until the paramount United
States Supreme Court decision in 1980, Diamond v. Chakrabarty,n that the Court
interpreted patent laws to include genetically-altered living microorganisms as
patentable subject matter.
13
Since the 1980s, biotechnological patents have escalated into an important yet
controversial means of protecting scientific knowledge.' 4 Moreover, one scholar in
3. 35 U.S.C.A. § 112 (West 1984) (emphasis added).
4. Stephen P. Hoffert, USPTO Issues Biotech Patent Guidelines, THE SCIENTIST, July 6, 1998, at 1.
5. Id.; see Regents of the Univ. of California v. Eli Lily and Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
(holding one of the University's patents involving recombinant DNA technology invalid for failure to comply with
the statutory written description requirement); iers v. Revel, 984 E2d 1164, 1170 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (concluding
that one inventor's earlier-filed foreign application did not provide sufficient written description support of the
DNA coding for a specific protein because he made no disclosure of the DNA's nucleotide sequence); Amgen,
Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1213-14 (Fed. Cir, 1991) (holding that plaintiff's patent consisting of
generic DNA sequence claims did not satisfy the enablement requirement).
6. See infra Part H1 (providing an overview of the biotechnology industry).
7. Brian C. Cannon, Note, Toward a Clear Standard of Obviousness for Biotechnology Patents, 79
CoRNELLL. REV. 735,735 (1994); see infra Part I.B (discussing the unprecedented growth of the biotech industry
into the new millennium).
8. See JAMES D. WATSON ET AL, RECOMBINANT DNA 13, 13 (2d ed. 1992) (stating that "DNA" is the
abbreviated form of "deoxyribonucleic acid").
9. Id. at 21.
10. See Cannon, supra note 7, at 735, n.l (stating that "[iln 1992, the average cost of discovering and
bringing a single drug to market exceeded $230 million").
11. Yusing Ko, Note, An Economic Analysis of Biotechnology Patent Protection, 102 YALE L.J. 777,777
(1992).
12. 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
13. Id.at310.
14. Cannon, supra note 7, at 735; see Carrie F. Walter, Note, Beyond the Harvard Mouse: Current Patent
Practice and the Necessity of Clear Guidelines in Biotechnology Patent Law, 73 IND. LJ. 1025, 1025 (1998)
(asserting that "due to the controversial nature of patenting 'life,' or products intimately associated with life, it
is necessary to pursue patent protection with solid grounding in patent law that is adequately suited to biological
advances"); see also Neil Gross & John Carey, Who Owns the Tree of Life? Fierce Battles are Raging Over the
Legal and Economic Implications of Gene Patents, Bus. Wy., Nov. 4, 1996, at 194 (stating that "when you
consider how difficult it has been to locate and decode genes, the idea of patenting them begins to make sense");
Hoffert, supra note 4, at 1 (noting that Jonathan A. King, Professor of Biology at MIT, and an outspoken critic
of gene patents, asserts that "the high cost of protecting gene patents ought to make researchers, universities, and
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particular argues that the Federal Circuit'st5 most recent patent infringement
decision, Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly and Co.,16 "may
profoundly limit the scope of protection available for new gene inventions[.] ... [lit
represents the latest advance in an ominous trend towards imposition of uniquely
heightened patentability requirements for biotechnological inventions."' 7
In view of the many recent high-profile court cases on the patenting of gene
sequences, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) recently issued
interim guidelines,'8 revised in December 1999,' 9 to assist patent examiners in
determining whether the requisite written description requirement for patent
applications has been satisfied.20 According to the USPTO, the written description
requirement will not be met unless it is made apparent to those skilled in the art or
science that the inventor was in possession of the claimed invention at the time of
filing the patent application.2' John J. Doll, Director of Biotechnology Examination
at the USPTO, explains that these guidelines are "an attempt to begin to understand
the full implications of court decisions on patents in biotechnology. 22
This Comment focuses on the newly revised USPTO interim written description
guidelines and their effect on the biotechnology industry in acquiring future gene
patents for scientific discoveries. Part II includes an introduction to the
fundamentals of molecular biology,3 followed by a brief discussion on
biotechnology as a commercial enterprise.24 After a general examination into the
United States patent law system in Part I1,25 this Comment explores the evolution
of the historical written description requirement from its first function as a mere
companies question the value to society of turning biological entities into private property").
15. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has jurisdiction over patent cases. In order
to ease readability of this Comment, further references to this particular court will be to the Federal Circuit.
16. 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
17. Janice M. Mueller, The Evolving Application of the Written Description Requirement to
Biotechnological Inventions, 13 BERKELEY TECH. 1.J. 615. 615 (1998); see Harris A. Pitlick, The Mutation on
the Description Requirement Gene, 80 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SoC'Y 209 (1998) (arguing that Lilly and Revel
are "such extreme departures from conventional description requirement jurisprudence that the need for new
thinking about the issue is now even more manifest"); see also Michael Delmas Plimier, Genentech, Inc. v. Novo
Nordisk & University of California v. Eli Lilly and Co., 13 BERKELEYTECH. LJ. 149,150 (1998) (stating that the
Federal Circuit's most recent patent infringement decisions "may reduce the incentive to invent because patent
protection would require a large disclosure and result in only narrow protection").
18. Request for Comments on Interim Guidelines for Examination of Patent Applications Under the 35
U.S.C. 112 1 "Written Description" Requirement, 63 Fed. Reg. 32,639 (1998) [hereinafter Guidelines].
19. Revised Interim Guidelines for Examination of Patent Applications Under the 35 U.S.C. 112 1
"Written Description" Requirement; Request for Comments, 64 Fed. Reg. 71,427 (1999) [hereinafter Revised
Guidelines].
20. Hoffert, supra note 4, at 1.
21. 35U.S.C.A. § 112 (West 1984).
22. Hoffert, supra note 4, at I (quoting John J. Doll, Director of Biotechnology Examination at the
USPTO).
23. See infra Part Il.A (discussing the scientific foundation upon which biotechnology research is based).
24. See infra Part 1I.B (discussing the corporate existence of biotechnology in the U.S. market).
25. See infra Part In (reviewing federal statutory law under the U.S. patent law system).
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"notice" provision to its modem function as a means of providing support for a
patent claim.26 Then, in Part V, this Comment analyzes the legality of the USPTO
description requirement guidelines in light of controlling legal precedent and
relevant public policy concems.27 In addition, Part V considers the implications of
the guidelines for the biotech industry, specifically in acquiring future patent
protection for scientific breakthroughs?4 Furthermore, Part V discusses and
compares the recently approved European Union Biotechnology Directive approach
to the written description requirement with that of the USPTO guidelines.29 Finally,
this Comment concludes that the USPTO revised interim guidelines are fully
consistent with controlling legal precedent.30 The revised interim guidelines are
primarily designed to assist USPTO personnel in analyzing whether claimed subject
matter complies with substantive law.3 ' Notwithstanding the legality of the revised
interim guidelines, this Comment argues that the development of unique biotech-
specific patent law principles may affect the development of future biotechnological
innovations.32
I1. BIOTECHNOLOGY
Biotechnology exists in two separate contexts-as a scientific art, and as a
commercial entity.3 3 In its scientific context, biotechnology is referred to as the use
of living organisms to produce commercial products. 4 For Wall Street financiers
and venture capitalists who invest significant amounts of capital into the
development of biotech companies, biotechnology is commercial-representing a
"hot, new source of financial risk and opportunity."35 Accordingly, biotechnology
26. See infra Part IV (tracing the historical roots of the written description requirement through the modem
interpretation by the USPTO in its new guidelines).
27. See infra Part V (examining the legality of the new USPTO guidelines in view of several landmark
Federal Circuit Court decisions on written description requirement and enablement jurisprudence).
28. See infra Part V.B.4.b (discussing the effect of the USPTO guidelines on the biotech industry with
respect to obtaining patent protection for genetic engineering inventions).
29. See infra Part V.C (comparing the European Union's approach to the USPTO approach in meeting the
written description requirement).
30. See infra Part V.B.4.a (concluding that the new USPTO guidelines are legal in light of binding
precedent).
31. Revised Guidelines, supra note 19, at 71,427.
32. See infra Part V.D (arguing that narrow biotech-specific patent law principles may, ultimately, have
the effect of chilling the development of new biotechnological inventions).
33. U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, BIOECHNOLOGY IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY,
OTA-BA-494 29,29 (1991) [hereinafter BIOTECHNOLOGY IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY].
34. MICHAEL A. EPSTEIN, MODERN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2d ed. 1992); see id. (defining
"biotechnology" further as "any process in which organisms, tissues, cells, organelles, or isolated enzymes are
used to convert biological or other raw materials to products of greater values, as well as the design and use of
reactors, fermenters, downstream processing, [and] analytical and control equipment associated with biological
manufacturing processes").
35. BIOTECHNOLOGY IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY, supra note 33, at 29.
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has developed into a booming industry with significant commercial value.36 Yet, in
order to understand the problems facing the biotech industry in the patenting of
genes, one must first grasp the fundamentals of molecular biology, the tools upon
which commercial biotechnology is built.
A. Biotechnology as a Science
1. DNA as the Primary Genetic Material
DNA was initially discovered in the late nineteenth century by Swiss scientist,
Frederick Miescher.37 However, it was not until the discovery of the structure of
DNA by scientists Francis Crick and James Watson, nearly a hundred years later,
in 1953,38 that the foundation was set for the exciting new field of scientific
experimentation which later became known as the biotechnology industry. DNA is
said to be the "prime molecule of life," because the hereditary information that
determines the structure of proteins is carried within it.39 A "gene" is the "basic
physical and functional unit of heredity."
The characteristic structure of DNA resembles a long, twisted ladder in the
shape of a double helix.4' The "sides" of the DNA molecule are comprised of sugar-
phosphate backbones, and the "rungs" of the double helix are comprised of bases,42
oriented in such a configuration to form hydrogen bonds, which are paired to bases
on the opposite strand.43 The four nucleotide bases of DNA consist of adenine,
cytosine, guanine, and thymine.44 These bases always exist as "complementary"
36. See Aris PersidisBiotechnology in 1998 and Beyond, 16 NATuREBIOTECHNOLOOY 1378,1378 (1998)
(noting that in 1996, the total amount of money raised through initial public offerings, venture rounds, and other
types of fundraising totaled $7.6 billion for research and development); see also Michael Giantruco, Bio Buys,
Part IJ.(Stocks) (Science & Technology Insights), FORBES, May 6, 1996, at 128 (listing the 1995 revenues of three
of the biggest U.S. biotech companies, all of which are located in California: Amgen (Thousand Oaks, CA) netted
$538 million on a revenue of $1.9 billion, Chiron (Emeryville, CA) had revenues of $1.1 billion, and Genentech
(South San Francisco, CA) netted $146 million on a revenue of $918 million).
37. WATSON Er AL, supra note 8, at 14.
38. Id. at 21.
39. Id. at 1.
40. See Eric Mills Holmes, Solving the Insurance/Genetic Fair/Unfair Discrimination Dilemma in Light
of the Human Genome Project, 85 KY. LJ. 503, 519-20 (1997) (explaining that the human genome, where all
human genes reside, is made up of 46 chromosomes, 23 inherited from each parent, with each chromosome
comprised of DNA). "A genome is the totality of the genetic information that is stored in cells and passed from
one generation to the next," or the "total genetic code." Id.
41. See WATSON ErAL., supra note 8, at 21 (explaining that the double helix is held together by hydrogen
bonds formed between the base pairs).
42. Id.;seeTHoMAsD.BROCK&McHALT.MADIAN,BIoLoOYOFMCRooROANSMSSO(5thed. 1988)
(explaining that a "base", either of a purine or a pyrimidine chemical class, assists in forming the structure of a
"nucleotide"). A "nucleotide" is a monomeric unit of nucleic acid, composed of a five-carbon sugar, phosphate,
and nitrogenous base. Id.
43. WATSONETAL, supra note 8, at 21.
44. Id.
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base pairs because adenine can only pair with thymine, while guanine can only pair
with cytosine.45 It is this complementary base pairing that enables DNA to have the
same structure with respect to any sequence of bases.46
The nucleotide base pairs are the elements of the genetic code-a DNA type of
alphabet in which the base pairs decipher the genetic code for specific amino
acids.47 A group of three nucleotides signifies a codon, and each codon, in turn,
codes for an amino acid.4 A codon exists "for each of the twenty amino acids that
form the building blocks of proteins." 49 Through the complex procedures of
transcription and translation, a sequence of codons is deciphered by DNA in order
to produce a specific protein. 0 However, a disruption in the genetic sequence, such
as the changing of a base pair, results in a mutation that has the effect of creating
a different protein from the one originally encoded for by the DNA. 1
The role of proteins involves the execution of many functions inside and
outside the cell. Aside from their structural role in the formation of various
organelles, proteins are enzymes responsible for catalyzing different chemical
reactions within the cell that provide the cell with energy and synthesize chemicals
that are essential for cell support.52 Since the discovery of the structure and function
of DNA, technology in the area of genetics has moved remarkably fast.
53
2. Recombinant DNA Technology
The new biotechnology era was born in 1973 when scientists Herbert Boyer and
Stanley Cohen demonstrated that "a gene could be cut from the DNA of one
organism, recombined in vitro with DNA of a host organism, and re-introduced into
cells of the host to confer the gene's characteristic trait to the host. '54 Because of
45. See Id. at 21, 22 (noting that "the existence of the double helix provides a structural chemical
explanation for Chargaff's rules: A=T and G=C").
46. See id. at 22,36 (describing that during the process of DNA replication, each single DNA chain serves
as a template for either complementary DNA molecule).
47. Id.at33,36.
48. Id. at 36 (adding that groups of 3 nucleotides can be arranged in 64 independent permutations to code
for the 20 different amino acids).
49. Jeremy Cubert, US. Patent Policy and Biotechnology: Growing Pains on the Cutting Edge, 77 J. PAT.
&TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 151, 153 (1995).
50. WATSON ET AL., supra note 8, at 36.
51. Id. at 43 (explaining that different types of mutations will cause the proteins to function differently).
52. Timothy G. Hofmeyer, Everybody's Got Something to Hide Except Me and My Patented Monkey:
Patentability of Cloned Organisms, 16 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFo. L. 971, 978 (1998).
53. See Walter, supra note 14, at 1028 (summarizing that by 1966 the complete genetic code had been
deciphered, and in the early 1970s, the first recombinant DNA molecule had been created); see also
BITECHNOLOGY IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY, supra note 33, at 203 (stating that "the 1980's provided a harvest of
new biotechnological processes and products as well as incentive for research for future inventions").
54. Lorance L. Greenlee, Biotechnology Patent Law: Perspective of the First Seventeen Years, Prospective
on the Next Seventeen Years, 68 DENY. U. L. REV. 127, 127 (1991). See generally Stanley Cohen et al.,
Construction of Biologically Functional Bacterial Plasmids In Vitro, 70 PROC. NAT'L. AcAD. Sc. USA 3240
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recent breakthroughs in the scientific areas of biochemistry, genetics, and molecular
biology, scientists can now manipulate genes in "an unprecedented fashion."'55
Recombinant DNA technology or genetic engineering, as introduced by Boyer and
Cohen, is a fundamental technique involving the "splicing together of DNA from
different sources and placing the recombined DNA code into another cell. 5 6 By
utilizing this remarkable technology, the biotech industry is able to mass produce
large amounts of a desired protein for important research and commercial
biomedical products.5 7
In order to produce a desired protein using recombinant DNA technology, the
complementary DNA (cDNA) that encodes the protein must initially be cloned.58
The process of cloning a gene consists of three steps: (1) the selection of a DNA
source for cloning (i.e., chromosomal DNA or cDNA depending on the nature of
the particular problem being researched); 9 (2) the production of a series of DNA
fragments that can be inserted into a plasmid vector and then introduced into a
bacteria host;w and (3) the isolation of the protein through the screening of the
cDNA library for the desired sequence.61
The following example illustrates the practical benefits of recombinant DNA
technology.62 A person with diabetes is unable to produce insulin.63 Prior to the time
in which recombinant techniques for the production of human insulin were
developed, diabetic patients received injections of animal insulin and often
experienced allergic reactions as a result.6 However, the use of human insulin
produced by recombinant techniques for diabetics reduces the likelihood of such
(1973) (setting forth the original Boyer-Cohen experiment involving recombinant DNA technology).
55. Dan L. Burk, Biotechnology and Patent Law: Fitting Innovation to the Procrustean Bed, 17 RurTERS
COMPUTER & TECH. LJ. 1, 2 (1991).
56. See Cubert, supra note 49, at 153 (explaining that "[a] piece of DNA coding for a human protein, for
example, can be spliced into bacterial DNA and inserted into the bacteria"). The newly manipulated bacteria holds
"instructions for the synthesizing of human protein:' Id.
57. Id. at 152.
58. WATSON ET AL, supra note 8, at 100 (explaining that cDNA is a DNA copy of messenger RNA
(mRNA)).
59. See id. (noting that a scientist only interested in a protein's amino acid sequence may obtain such
information from a eDNA's nucleotide sequence).
60. Id. The plasmid vectors containing the inserted fragments that in turn were introduced into a bacteria
host are typically grown on an agar plate. Id. at 100-01. Because vectors are carriers of antibiotic-resistant genes,
"only those bacteria containing plasmids will grow when plated onto agar containing the antibiotic." Id. at 101.
Accordingly, colonies am formed from the growth of each resistant bacterial cell. Id. In scientific terms, a"library"
refers to this collection of cloned DNA fragments that were introduced into the bacteria host. Id.
61. Id. at 101.
62. This fact pattern is taken from the landmark patent infringement dispute between University of
California and Eli Lilly and Co. See Regents of the Univ. of California v. Eli Lilly and Co., 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed.
Cir. 1997) (discussing the university's patents in issue which involve recombinant plasmids and microorganisms
that produce human insulin); see also Cannon, supra note 7, at 739-40 (illustrating the benefits of cloning genes
with a set of facts taken from Amgen).
63. Eli Lilly and Co., 119 F.3d at 1563.
64. Id.
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allergic reactions.6s Potential sales of this human insulin could reach hundreds of
millions of dollars.6 In anticipation of this commercial potential, biotech
companies will invest capital into research and development necessary to
investigate the genetic foundation for human insulin. Once the genetic foundation
is discovered, the company can quickly reproduce human insulin at low cost
through recombinant DNA techniques. 67 When a patent is issued for such a
discovery, that company will have the exclusive right to sell human insulin and
exploit a lucrative market for the next twenty years.'
B. Biotechnology as a Commercial Enterprise
Created in the early 1970s, biotechnology is a relatively new industry that
rapidly expanded in the decade after its inception. 69 Financial analysts predict the
biotech industry "will become a major commercial enterprise," playing a principal
role in the U.S. economy.' ° Annual worldwide sales of commercial biotech products
increased from zero in 1980 to $5.9 billion in 1992.7' By the end of the year 2000,
sales are projected to rise to $50 billion.72
The patenting process plays a very important role in the commercialization of
biotechnology products.7' In addition to requiring significant capital expenditure for
the initial research and development, the biotech industry requires considerable
financial backing to complete the necessary Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
regulatory approval process.74 Acquiring such capital is dependent upon the ability
65. Id.
66. See Eliot Marshall, A Bitter Battle Over Insulin Gene, 277 SCIENCE 1028, 1028 (1997) (stating that
"[h]ad UC persuaded or forced Lilly to pay royalties, it might have tapped into an insulin business worth, by
Lilly's reckoning, 'hundreds of millions of dollars'").
67. See supra text accompanying notes 56-57 (explaining that the technique of recombinant DNA
technology enables the biotech industry to mass produce large amounts of a desired protein for important
commercial products).
68. See 35 U.S.C.A. § 154(a)(2) (West Supp. 1999) (stating that "such grant shall be for a term beginning
on the date on which the patent issues and ending 20 years from the date on which the application for the patent
was filed in the United States").
69. WATsON Er AL., supra note 8, at 76; see BIOTECHNOLOY IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY, supra note 33, at
31 (listing many products that can be created or enhanced through biotechnology: "Pharmaceuticals and
diagnostics for humans and animals, seeds, whole plants, fertilizers, food additives, industrial enzymes, and oil-
eating microbes').
70. COMM. ON LIFE SCIENcEs AND HEALTH OF THE FEDERAL COORDINATING COUNCIL FOR SCIENCE,
ENGINEERING,ANDTECHNOLoGY,REPORTONBOTECHNOLOGYFORTHE21STCENTURY: REALIZINGTHEPROMISE
5 (Comm. Print 1993) [hereinafter BIOTmCHNOLOGY FORTHE 21ST CENTURY].
71. Id.
72. Id.
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to secure patent protection for a prospective product. 75 On Wall Street, biotech
companies with FDA-approved drugs are readily distinguishable from those without
FDA-approved drugs--once a company receives FDA approval for its drug, that
company's "market capitalization soars. For instance, according to UBS
Securities, Inc. analyst Marc Ostro, a "biotech company awaiting such approval has
a typical market cap of $350 million, while companies with approved drugs have
market caps that run into the billions."
77
In the early 1990s, the young biotech industry experienced a big boom. 78 As
when any other hot, new industry first arrives on the scene, everyone wanted a piece
of it-scientists left theirjobs to start up new biotech companies; venture capitalists
offered outrageous amounts of money to back the start-ups; and the investing public
devoured the biotech initial public offerings without hesitation.79 However, because
of the rush to get products out into the market, many of the biotech start-ups either
misinterpreted the complexities of scientific research or launched clinical trials that
failed to get FDA approval.80 As a result, what began as a "boom," soon became a
"bust," as concepts failed, capital was depleted, and envisioned biotech products
never materialized.8'
This "bust" forced the biotech industry to grow up fast. With venture capitalists
now hesitant to provide financial support for start-ups, scientist-entrepreneurs had
to learn the difficult task of establishing credibility by negotiating deals with
pharmaceutical companies, establishing collaborations with prominent scientists,
and spending capital in a more prudent manner.8 2 Having accomplished this task,
the new biotech companies experienced a "second, quieter biotech boom" in 1995
that continues today.83 This new maturity in the biotech industry, however,
currently raises questions about the corresponding maturity in the approach to
patentability procedures for biotech inventions under United States patent law.
75. Id.; see Persidis, supra note 36, at 1378 (illustrating that some biotech companies that capitalize on
certain technical advances in one year may fail to sustain investor interest the next year if there is lack of
additional progress).
76. Erick Schonfeld & Joyce E. Davis, The New Biotech Boom: A Star is Born Once Again Biotech Is All
the Rage. But It's Different This Time, FORTUNE, Jan. 13, 1997, at 82.
77. See id. (adding that although there have been only 46 biotech drugs "approved by the [FDA] in the past
15 years, the pipeline is brimming with compounds that are close to being ready for the marketplace"). In fact,
43 new FDA approvals are expected within the next two years alone. Id.
78. Id.
79. See id. (adding that start-up biotech companies were "so new that there was no real sense of how long
they would take to make money or what kinds of products would eventually be viable").
80. Id.
81. See id. (noting that by 1993, "investors who had once indiscriminately bought anything related to a
recombinant protein were.. .just as indiscriminate in their aversion to all things biotech").
82. Id.; see Burk, supra note 55, at 19 (explaining that smaller biotech companies have formed
collaborations with the more traditional, larger pharmaceutical companies because of a need for capital).
83. Schonfeld & Davis, supra note 76, at 82; see Persidis, supra note 36, at 1379 (asserting that the best
indication "that new [scientific] technologies and applications will continue to emerge and be supported is through
the continued interest by private venture sources").
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m. OVERVIEW OF UNrrED STATES PATENT LAW
The foundation of United States patent law is rooted in Article I, Section 8,
Clause 8 of the United States Constitution.I The Constitution broadly empowers
Congress "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries."85 This progress is promoted through the enactment of
patent laws, which offer inventors exclusive rights for a limited period of time as
an incentive for their ingenuity and research efforts. 6 Believing that "ingenuity
should receive a liberal encouragement,"' Thomas Jefferson authored the first of
these United States patent laws, the Patent Act of 17 9 3 .s
The statutory provisions of patent law have undergone relatively minor changes
over time as subsequent patent statutes in 1836, 1870, and 1874 retained Jefferson's
broad philosophy regarding the issuing of patents.89 Moreover, when Congress
recodified patent laws in 1952, it left the broad scope of the statutes intact, making
only a slight change in replacing the word "art" with "process.!' "9 The 1952
modification reflects Congress' intent for the scope of the statute to "include
anything under the sun that is made by man." 9
The current Patent Act is codified under Title 35 of the United States Code and
grants the inventor a twenty-year exclusive right to the invention. Current law also
includes a derivative right to exclude others from making, using, or selling the
invention9 3 In exchange for this governmental grant, the inventor must disclose the
invention in what is designated as the "enabling disclosure."
94
The issuance of a patent is dependent upon meeting the requisite statutory
requirements. The threshold statutory inquiry involves whether the claimed
invention is patentable subject matter9 Even if the general subject matter is
patentable, the specific invention itself must also satisfy a three-pronged inquiry for
novelty, nonobviousness, and utility before the government will issue a patent.9
84. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
85. Id.
86. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 307.
87. 5 WRnTINGS OFTHOMASJEFMFRSON 75,75 (Washington ed. 1871). For a detailed account of Thomas
Jefferson's administration of the patent system under the Patent Act of 1790, see Graham v. John Deere Co., 383
U.S. 1, 6-11 (1966).
88. Act of Feb. 21, 1793, § 1, 1 Stat. 319.
89. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309.
90. Id.
91. Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 1979, at 5 (1952) and H.R. REP. NO. 1923, at 6 (1952)).
92. 35 U.S.C.A. § 154(a)(2) (West Supp. 1999).
93. Id. § 271(a) (West Supp. 1999).
94. Id. § 112 (West 1984); see supra note 3 and accompanying text (setting forth the enablement
requirement of the Patent Act).
95. 35 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West 1984).
96. See infra Part HI.B (discussing the essential requirements of the Patent Act).
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Although this Comment is concerned primarily with the written description
requirement of enablement disclosure, it is necessary to understand the entire patent
process in order to appreciate the relationship among the distinct statutory
requirements and their role in the determination of a patent.
A. Is the Claimed Invention Patentable Subject Matter?
The entire scope of patentable subject matter under United States patent law is
set forth in section 101 of the Patent Act: "[w]hoever invents or discovers any new
and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new
and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the
conditions and requirements of this title." 97 Thus, the threshold inquiry for all patent
applications is whether the claimed invention falls within this broad scope.
Under prior case law, it has been established that patentable subject matter does
not extend to mathematical algorithms,98 natural phenomena,99 or products
of nature. 00 Because of this precedent, scientific researchers feared that their claims
in biotechnology would be rejected since they were products of nature.'°t
However, in the landmark case of Diamond v. Chakrabarty,'2 the Supreme Court
held for the first time that a human-made, genetically engineered microorganism
is patentable subject matter and thus falls within the scope of the Patent Act.103
The issue in Chakrabarty involved the patentability of a human-made,
genetically transformed bacterium that could break down multiple components of
crude oil.'04 In deciding that the bacterium was patentable subject matter, the Court
reasoned that patents exist in order to provide incentives for research.'05 Although
genetic engineering was unforeseen by Congress, it was within the broad scope of
the legislative purpose.'O° Additionally, the Court recognized that the relevant
distinction between patentable and unpatentable claims is that of "human-made"
inventions versus "products of nature" respectively.'07 According to the Court,
biotechnology claims are patentable when a transformed organism is not found to
97. 35 U.S.C.A. § 101.
98. See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584,595 (1978) (holding that mathematical formulas are non-patentable).
99. See Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 131 (1948) (concluding that newly
discovered natural principles are non-patentable).
100. See id. at 130 (stating that "patents cannot issue for the discovery of the phenomena of
nature .... They are manifestations of laws of nature, free to all men and reserved exclusively to none"). For
example, a new mineral discovered in the earth or a new plant discovered in the wild is non-patentable subject
matter. Id.
101. Cannon, supra note 7, at 741.
102. 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
103. ld. at 309-10.
104. Id. at 305.
105. Id. at 307.
106. Id. at 314-16.
107. ld. at 313.
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exist in nature. 08
B. The Three-Pronged Inquiry for Patentability
1. Novelty
After determining that the claimed invention is patentable subject matter within
the meaning of the Act, the next hurdle encompasses the novelty requirement of the
Patent Act. As delineated in section 102 of the Patent Act, an invention that does
not exist in the prior art is novel.' 9 In other words, the Patent Act requires an
applicant to be the "first inventor to confer the benefit of the invention on the
public."' O1 In addition to the novelty requirement, the remaining two prongs of
nonobviousness and utility must also be met.
Some have argued that it is not possible for any living matter to be considered
novel because gene sequences exist naturally."' However, this line of argument
fails to acknowledge how "naturally existing" organisms are altered through
biotechnology in such a way that they dramatically differ from "naturally
occurring" organisms."2 If a scientist seeks to patent a naturally occurring human
gene sequence, the sequence would be treated like naturally occurring chemicals
and substances under current policy." 3 Thus, genes in an isolated or purified form
may be patented, but a gene sequence that remains in the form in which the scientist
108. Cannon, supra note 7, at 742. A gene not naturally occurring in a species is expressed by a transgenic
organism. The transgenic Harvard mouse is an example of a patented transgenic organism. See U.S. Pat. No.
4,736,866 (Apr. 12, 1988). A team of researchers at Harvard initially developed a genetically engineered mouse
(Harvard mouse) that is "highly susceptible to cancer" to be used as an "effective model for [researching] the
contributions of genetics to the development of cancer." David G. Scalise & Daniel Nugent, Patenting Living
Matter in the European Community: Diriment of the Draft Directive, 16 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 990, 1008 (1993).
The Harvard mouse was the first patent issued by the USPTO on a "multi-cellular living organism." Id.
109. The term "prior ar" is used to describe sources of information that focus on the same subject matter
as the invention, already accessible in the public domain. See 35 U.S.C.A. § 102(a) (West 1984) (stating that "[a]
person shall be entitled to a patent unless the invention was known or used by others in this country, or patented
or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country, before the invention thereof by the applicant for
patent").
110. See Andrew T. Kight, Note, Pregnant With Ambiguity: Credibility and the PTO Utility Guidelines in
Light of Brenner, 73 IND.LJ. 997, 1008 (1998) (noting that information is not in the hands of the public provided
that it has not been "published, publicly sold or used, or previously invented and not abandoned").
111. See Kalo Innoculant Co., 333 U.S. at 131 (holding that certain strains of each species of root-nodule
bacteria are "no more than the discovery of some of the handiwork of nature and hence [are] not patentable').
112. Walter, supra note 14, at 1037.
113. See Matthew Erramouspe, Comment, Staking Patent Claims on the Human Blueprint: Rewards and
Rent-Dissipating Races, 43 UCLA L. REV. 961,988-90 (1996) (explaining that naturally occurring substances
that are extracted, isolated, and purified, may be patented, providing that these substances have s6me greater value
than their prior existence in natural form). See generally Merck & Co. v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 253 F.2d
156, 164-65 (4th Cir. 1958) (upholding a patent with product claims to vitamin B(12)-active composition). "The
'matter' of which patentable new and useful compositions are composed necessarily includes naturally existing
elements and materials." Id. at 162.
1055
2000 1 Biotechnological Gene Patent Applications
initially discovered the sequence is not patentable under current law.114 An isolated
or purified gene sequence is obtained when scientists separate the protein-coding
sections from extraneous information in a gene sequence. 1 5 This purification is
accomplished through cloning techniques 116 and accordingly, the resulting isolated
gene sequence meets the statutory novelty requirement.
2. Nonobviousness
The significant analysis under the nonobviousness issue involves the close
examination of whether "the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at
the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which
said subject matter pertains."'1 7 In 1995, the nonobviousness requirement of the
Patent Act was amended in order to incorporate provisions pertaining to
biotechnology."s However, the basic principles of the requirement have essentially
remained the same. A new invention will not receive patent protection if one with
skill in the prior art could readily execute such an invention.' 9 In the biotechnology
arena, obviousness has been a delicate subject, because similar techniques are used
by scientists in isolating different gene sequences, even though the gene sequence
itself is new. 2°
114. Erramouspe, supra note 113, at 988.
115. Walter, supra note 14, at 1038.
116. Erramouspe, supra note 113, at 991.
117. 35 U.S.C.A. § 103(a) (West Supp. 1999).
118. See U § 103(b) (West Supp. 1999) (setting forth the nonobviousness requirement for biotechnological
inventions:
(1) Notwithstanding subsection (a), and upon timely election by the applicant for patent to
proceed under this subsection, a biotechnological process using or resulting in a composition of matter
that is novel under section 102 and nonobvious under subsection (a) of this section shall be considered
nonobvious if-(A) claims to the process and the composition of matter are contained in either the
same application for patent or in separate applications having the same effective filing date; and (B)
the composition of matter, and the process at the time it was invented, were owned by the same person
or subject to an obligation of assignment to the same person.
(2) A patent issued on a process under paragraph (1)-(A) shall also contain the claims to the
composition of matter used in or made by that process, or (B) shall, if such composition of matter is
claimed in another patent, be set to expire on the same date as such other patent, notwithstanding
section 154.
(3) For purposes of paragraph (1), the term "biotechnological process" means-(A) a process of
genetically altering or otherwise inducing a single- or multi-celled organism to--(i) express an
exogenous nucleotide sequence, (ii) inhibit, eliminate, augment, or alter expression of an endogenous
nucleotide sequence, or (iii) express a specific physiological characteristic not naturally associated with
said organism; (B) cell fusion procedures yielding a cell line that expresses a specific protein, such as
a monoclonal antibody; and (C) a method of using a product produced by a process defined by
subparagraph (A) or (B), or a combination of subparagraphs (A) and (B)).
119. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 37 (1966) (finding the claims in issue of a patent failed to
meet the nonobviousness test under section 103 as one with skill in the relevant art would have found the
differences between the claims and prior art to be obvious).
120. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patenting the Human Genome, 39 EMORY LJ. 721,736 (1990).
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In Graham v. John Deere Co.," the United States Supreme Court articulated
the modem test for obviousness, composed of three requirements: (1) the courts
must determine the scope and content of the prior art; (2) the courts must ascertain
the differences between the prior art and the claimed invention; and (3) the courts
must resolve the level of ordinary skill in the relevant art.22 Above all, the courts
must consider the obviousness or nonobviousness of the subject matter in light of
all these elements.23 In addition, the Federal Circuit added a fourth element to the
Graham three-pronged test, requiring consideration of the product's success in the
commercial market, the existing demand for the product, and the inability of others
to create the invention.'24 Although these additional factors are not alone
dispositive, they are highly persuasive in fulfilling the requisite nonobviousness
requirement of the Patent Act.'2 In sum, an application of the Graham test renders
a claimed invention obvious if there is a nexus between the invention and the prior
art that could be accomplished by an individual of ordinary skill in the pertinent
art.
126
The vague language of the Patent Act's nonobviousness requirement'27 poses
significant difficulty in the patenting of gene sequences.'2 In particular, the
language of section 103 does not specify whether the nonobviousness requirement
can be met by examining the method of acquiring the sequence or rather, whether
the sequence itself must exhibit nonobviousness. 29 Indeed, the method of cDNA
sequencing has become rather routine among the scientific community. However,
"[e]ven if the method used to obtain the sequences is obvious, it does not
necessarily follow that the sequences themselves are also obvious."'' " In the actual
sequencing process, the prior art is of little, if any, value and simply acts as a means
of determining whether a particular gene sequence is indeed a new sequence.'
The Federal Circuit decision of In re Deuel32 specifically addressed the
nonobviousness requirement in the context of biotechnology. In Deuel, the court
appeared to loosen the requisite nonobviousness standard by asserting that "[a]
121. 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
122. Id. at 17 (1966); see id. at 18 (explaining that although the Court has focused on the proper standard
to be applied by the courts, the USPTO has the ultimate responsibility for determining patentability).
123. Id. at 17.
124. See Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367,1380 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (holding an
assay using monoclonal antibodies as nonobvious).
125. Cannon, supra note 7. at 746.
126. 35 U.S.C.A. § 103(a) (West Supp. 1999).
127. Id. § 103(c) (West Supp. 1999) (stating that "[p]atentability shall not be negatived by the manner in
which the invention was made").
128. Kight. supra note 110, at 1009.
129. Id.
130. Rebecca S. Eisenberg & Robert P. Merges, Opinion Letter as to the Patentability of Certain Inventions
Associated with the Identification of Partial cDNA Sequences, 23 AM. INTELL PROP. L. ASS'N QJ.1, 21 (1995).
131. Kight, supra note 110, at 1009.
132. 51 F.3d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
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general motivation to search for some gene that exists does not necessarily make
obvious a specifically-defined gene that is subsequently obtained as a result of that
search."'33 Thus, as a result of this decision, patents may be issued for DNA
molecules even if the applicant discovered the DNA by using an "obvious"
scientific method.'3 However, a 1995 amendment to section 103 of the Patent Act
suggests that both the process and the subject matter must be nonobvious in order
to meet the nonobviousness requirement. 35
3. Utility
The utility requirement is the final hurdle in the patent application process.
With its historical beginnings firmly grounded in the Constitution,136 the utility
requirement is now codified in section 101 of the Patent Act providing: "[w]hoever
invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a
patent therefor."' 37 However, because of the ambiguity of the term "useful" under
this section of the Patent Act, the United States Supreme Court has developed
standards for patent utility on a case-by-case basis.
In Brenner v. Manson, 38 the United States Supreme Court set forth specific
criteria for patent utility. 39 The Brenner Court reversed the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals (CCPA), the predecessor of the current Federal Circuit, and upheld
the rejection of a claim by the Patent Board for lack of utility."4 The decision
involved a patent for a synthesized compound produced by a chemical process that
had been claimed by the respondent, Manson.141 In particular, a class of compounds,
including the compound at issue, had undergone screening for possible tumor-
inhibiting effects in laboratory mice. 42 As a result of the testing, a homologue,
otherwise known as a chemically-related compound, to Manson's steroid, had
proven effective for that purpose. 43 In concluding that the steroid failed to meet the
requisite utility requirement, the Court promulgated three key findings affecting
biotechnological applications. First, the Court determined that Congress did not
intend the term "useful" to be so broad as to include "any invention not positively
133. Id. at 1558.
134. Id. at 1559; see Philippe Ducor, The Federal Circuit and In re Deuel: Does § 103 Apply to Naturally
Occurring DNA?, 77 L PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 871, 898 (1995) (noting that the Deuel decision seemed
inconsistent with prior understanding of the nonobviousness requirement).
135. 35 U.S.C.A. § 103(b)(1) (West Supp. 1999).
136. U.S. CONSr. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
137. 35 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West 1984).
138. 383 U.S. 519 (1966).
139. See id. at 533-35 (analyzing the utility of respondent's claimed compound).
140. Id. at 519.
141. Id. at 521.
142. Id. at 522.
143. Id.
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harmful to society." 144 Second, the Court expressed concern regarding the quid pro
quo of issuing a monopoly for a compound with an unknown function.1 45 Finally,
the Court concluded that utility is not established by merely proving that the
product is the result of scientific investigation.
14
Because the precise function of the chemical process was virtually unknown at
the time, the Court reasoned that the public would not reap any benefit in exchange
for a vast monopoly on future scientific knowledge.' 47 In stressing the quid pro quo
trait of patents, the Court acknowledged the significance of a patent monopoly and
the risks involved in issuing a patent that would not result in a significant
advancement of public knowledge. 48 Accordingly, the Court concluded that "a
patent is not a hunting license. It is not a reward for the search, but compensation
for its successful conclusion."' 49
The utility requirement may pose some problems in the patenting of gene
sequences.' In particular, the attempted patenting of expressed sequence tags
(ESTs), by the National Institute of Health, is illustrative of the controversy
surrounding the utility of the biotechnological arts.'15 In response to public criticism
stemming from the prevalent practice of rejecting biotech inventions for lack of
utility, the USPTO issued Utility Guidelines."5 2 These guidelines established
procedures for examiners to follow in their review of patent applications, and
prescribed certain criteria relating to "the evidence sufficient to establish lack of
utility.'
5 3
144. Id. at 533.
145. Id. at 534.
146. Id. at 535.
147. Id. at 534.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 536.
150. Christopher A. Michaels, Biotechnology and the Requirement for Utility in Patent Law, 76 J. PAT. &
TRADENARK OFF. SOC'Y 247,257-58 (1994).
151. K:ENNM J. BURCHF , BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 58 (1995); see id. (explaining
that ESTs are "short stretches sequenced from randomly selected... cDNAs that identify bits of the coding region
of genes, without identifying the function of the gene segment"). In the examination process the USPTO issued
an Office Action that resulted in the rejection of the ESTs claim under § 101 of the Patent Act, reasoning that "'the
mere mention of general possible uses is not sufficient to establish a definite utility because the instant application
does not disclose a patentable utility for the ... nucleotides of the claimed invention in their currently available
form"' and "'others would be compelled to experiment, interpret results, and invent a patentable utility for the
claimed nucleotides."' Id. at 58 n.77 (quoting I 1 BIOTECH. L. REP. 581 (1992)).
152. 60 Fed. Reg. 36,263 (1995).
153. KENNETH L BuRCHFIEL, BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE FEDERAL CIRCurr 10 (Supp. 1997); see Revised
Guidelines, supra note 19, at 71428 (noting that the USPTO is currently working on revising the 1995 Utility
Examination Guidelines in view of public comment and testimony received on the issue of the patentability of
ESTs and their corresponding utility).
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IV. THE EVOLUTION OF THE WRITrEN DESCRIPTION REQUIREMENT
As introduced in Part I of this Comment, a patent must adequately disclose a
description of the claimed invention.M In addition to the written description
requirement, the Patent Act further requires compliance with an "enablemente' 5
and "best mode"' 56 requirement. Although the specification requirement was
codified in the Patent Act of 1952, it was not until fifteen years later, in the decision
of Application of Ruschig157 that the statutory language was characterized "as
requiring a 'written description' of an invention, separate from and in addition to
an 'enabling' disclosure of how to make and use that invention.15
Given the rich legacy of the written description requirement, which has endured
for over two centuries since its debut in the Patent Act of 1790,59 this Comment
next briefly traces the historical development of the description requirement to its
modem role today under United States patent law.'60 This discussion then considers
the USPTO guidelines as the latest advance in the ever-evolving application of the
154. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (quoting the requisite written description requirement of §
112, 1 of the U.S. Patent Act).
155. See 35 U.S.C.A. § 112, J 1 (West 1984) (requiring that specification provide adequate information to
enable one skilled in the art to make and use the invention without undue experimentation). For a background on
the analysis of enablement issues relating to biotechnological inventions, see Exparte Forman, 230 U.S.P.Q. 546
(Bd. Pat. App. 1986), a case involving the patentability of recombinant oral vaccines. In Forman, the Board set
forth several factors to be considered in the analysis of enablement issues regarding biotechnological inventions:
"the quantity of experimentation necessary, the amount of direction or guidance presented, the presence or absence
of working examples, the nature of the invention, the state of the prior art, the relative skill of those in that art,
the predictability or unpredictability of the art and the breadth of the claims." id. at 547 (citing In re Rainer, 347
F.2d 574 (C.C.P.A. 1965)); see In re Wands, 858 F2d 731 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (affirming the use of the Forman
factors for analysis of enablement issues involving biotechnological applications); see also Amgen, 927 F.2d at
1213 (stating that "it is not necessary that a court review all the Wands factors to find a disclosure enabling ....
[Rather the factors] are illustrative, not mandatory"). The Federal Circuit concluded that Amgen had not
sufficiently enabled preparation of DNA sequences to support its generic claims. Id.
156. See 35 U.S.C.A. 112, 1 1 (West 1984) (providing that the inventor must set forth the best mode of
carrying out the invention); see also Chemcast Corp. v. Arco Indus. Corp., 913 F.2d 923, 927-28 (Fed. Cir. 1990)
(explaining that a proper best mode analysis consists of two elements). The first element is a subjective one and
asks "whether, at the time the inventor filed his patent application, he knew of a mode of practicing his claimed
invention that he considered to be better than any other." Id. at 928. If the inventor did indeed contemplate such
a preferred mode, the second inquiry of the analysis, an objective one, asks whether the disclosure is "adequate
to enable one skilled in the art to practice the best mode or, in other words, has the inventor 'concealed' his
preferred mode from the 'public'?" Id.
157. 379 F.2d 990 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
158. See Ruschig, 379 F.2d at 995 (framing the issue on appeal as "not whether [one skilled in the art] would
be so enabled but whether the specification discloses the compound to him, specifically, as something appellants
actually invented"); see also Mueller, supra note 17, at 616-17 (noting that difficulties have arisen since Ruschig
in "understanding and applying the written description requirement as a statutory criterion of separate purpose
and function from the enablement requirement").
159. Patent Act of 1790, § 2, 1 Stat. 109, 110-11 (repealed 1793).
160. See inf& notes 162-79 and accompanying text (tracing the historical development of the written
description requirement up to its modem role).
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written description requirement to inventions of the unpredictable arts,161 notably
genetic materials.
A. The Historic Evans v. Eaton Era of the Written Description Requirement
Over the past two centuries, as United States patent law transformed from a
central claiming system to the modem peripheral claiming system in use today, the
purpose and function of the written description requirement has changed.16 The
Patent Act of 1790 created the requirement for patent specification:
[Tihe grantee... of a patent [shall], at the time of granting the same,
deliver to the Secretary of State a specification in writing, containing a
description, accompanied with drafts or models .... which specification
shall be so particular . . as not only to distinguish the invention or
discovery from other things before known... but also to enable a workman
... skilled in the art... to make, construct, or use the same.
16 3
The Patent Act of 1793'64 repealed the 1790 Act and introduced "written
description" in place of the term "specification," requiring the inventor to "deliver
a written description of his invention.., in such full, clear and exact terms, as to
distinguish the same.' ' 5
In 1822, the United States Supreme Court construed the statutory language of
the 1793 Act.'66 The Court determined that the Act comprised two separate
requirements, each serving distinct roles: written description and enablement. 67 The
issue in Evans v. Eatones concerned the alleged infringement of a patent on a
"hopperboy," a machine used for the manufacture of flour in mills.'6 9 Patentee
Evans' written description of his patent specification failed to clearly distinguish
the invention of a "complete" hopperboy, which was already in the public domain,
from that of an "improvement" in the machine, which was what Evans had actually
invented.170 Understanding that the Act requires the specification to describe the
161. Biotechnological inventions are considered to be highly "unpredictable arts" by the USPTO and the
courts. Mechanical and electrical inventions, on the other hand, are the so-called "predictable arts."
162. See Mueller, supra note 17, at 618 n.6 (defining a "central claiming" system as referring "to the
drafting of a narrow claim to a particular embodiment with broad judicial interpretation of that claim as covering
all equivalents"). The modem "peripheral claiming" system currently in use involves '!reciting the periphery or
boundaries thereof and finding only those devices infringing that fall within the periphery." Id.
163. Id. at 618.
164. Patent Act of 1793, § 3, 1 Stat. 318, 321-22 (repealed 1836).
165. Id. at 321.
166. Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 356,433-34 (1822).
167. Id. at 433-34.
168. 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 356 (1822).
169. Id. at 357.
170. Id. at 434-35.
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invention '.'in such full, clear, and exact terms, as to distinguish the same from all
other things before known,' 7' the Court held Evans' patent invalid for failing "to
describe what his own improvement is, and to limit his patent to such
improvement."' 72 Thus, while it appeared that Evans' specification met the
enablement requirement, 173 it failed to comply with the second objective of a patent
specification-the written description requirement.' 74
The modem practice of peripheral claiming did not exist at the time of the
Evans decision. 7s During the Evans era, the written description requirement
essentially served as a "notice" function to the public of the scope of exclusive
rights claimed by an inventor. 76 In modem times, however, specific statements of
patent specification referred to as "claims" have taken over this role of "notice."'
177
Today, these "claims," which are single-sentence statements, "particularly [point]
out and distinctly [claim] the subject matter which the applicant regards as his
invention.' 78 In essence, the written description requirement as characterized in
Evans may properly be viewed as the historical predecessor of modem claiming
requirements.
79
B. The Modem Revival of the Written Description Requirement
The written description requirement started to assume a different role with the
enactment of the Patent Act of 1870, which expressly required the inclusion of
171. See id. at 434 (quoting the written description requirement of the Patent Act of 1793).
172. Id. at 435.
173. See id. at 433-34 (stating that one of the objectives of the specification is "to make known the manner
of constructing the machine (if the invention is of a machine) so as to enable artizans to make and use it, and thus
to give the public the full benefit of the discovery after the expiration of the patent"). However, the Court explains
that whether the plaintiff's patent is "sufficiently exact and minute in the description... [is] not material to the
present inquiry." Id. at 434.
174. The Evans Court states:
The other object of the specification is, to put the public in possession of what the party claims as his
own invention, so as to ascertain if he claim any thing that is in common use, or is already known, and
to guard against prejudice or injury from the use of an invention which the party may otherwise
innocently suppose not to be patented.
Id. at 434.
175. Mueller, supra note 17, at 619; see Markman v. Wcstview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370,375 (1996)
(noting that "[c]laim practice did not achieve statutory recognition until the passage of [the Act of 1836] and
inclusion of a claim did not become a statutory requirement until 1870").
176. Mueller, supra note 17, at 619-20.
177. See 35 U.S.C.A. § 112,1 2 (West 1984) (promulgating that the specification is concluded with the use
of one or more claims therein).
178. Id.
179. See Mueller, supra note 17, at 620 (explaining that the written description requirement now focuses
on "whether the inventor was 'in possession' of the claimed invention as of a particular date").
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claims.180 Since the written description requirement no longer served the function
of providing notice to the public of the scope of the patentee's asserted monopoly,
the statutory language of the description requirement turned into "a historical
anachronism without a role in the statutory scheme."1 81
The current written description requirement, set forth in section 112, paragraph
one of the Patent Act was enacted in 1952.182 This written description requirement
was interpreted for the next fifteen years as if its only purpose was to function as
the subject for the verb "enable" in the enablement requirement. 183 This
interpretation derived from the fact that the legislative history gave no indication
that the written description requirement had a separate function exclusive of the
enablement requirement.' The premise that Congress linked written description
only to the requirements for enablement and mode is further evidenced by the fact
that the requirement for patent claims, found in paragraph two of section 112,
makes no specific reference to "written description."1 85 However, it was the
judiciary, not Congress, that first announced the idea that a written description
could exist as a separate requirement from enablement disclosure.
1 86
The CCPA decision in Application of Ruschig87 signified the modem revival
of the written description requirement. In Ruschig, the court reviewed the rejection
of a patent claim of new benzene sulfonyl ureas (a chemical compound known as
chlorpropamide), and the process for their preparation.1 88 The patent was rejected
on the ground that the claim was unsupported by the specification because it did not
specifically identify or name the species of the asserted claim.8 9 In affirming the
Patent Board of Appeals, the Ruschig court applied the written description
requirement to the claim at issue subsequent to the filing of the application.19° The
court then ascertained whether the specification would disclose the compound (the
later-claimed invention) to one skilled in the art, and specifically, whether the
disclosure revealed something that the patentee had actually invented by the earlier
180. See Barker, 559 F.2d at 592 (noting that section 26 of the Patent Act of 1870 required that an inventor.
shall file in the patent office a written description of the (invention), and of the manner and
process of making, constructing, compounding, and using it, in such full, clear, concise,
and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art or science to which it appertains
... to make, construct, compound, and use the same).
181. Mueller, supra note 17, at 620.
182. 35 U.S.C.A. § 112, % 1; see supra note 3 and accompanying text (quoting the relevant language of the
current written description requirement).
183. Laurence H. Pretty, The Recline and Fall of Mechanical Genus Claim Scope Under "Written
Description" in the Sofa Case, 80 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 469, 470 (1998).
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Application of Ruschig, 379 F.2d 990 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
187. Id.
188. Id. at 990-91.
189. Id. at 991.
190. Id. at 995.
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application filing date. 19' In conclusion, the court held that the specification failed
to clearly convey to one skilled in the art that the patentee invented the
compound.'9 Thus, as a result of Ruschig, "written description" became a separate
and distinct legal requirement from enablement, necessary to demonstrate that the
patentee was in actual possession of the claimed invention as of the filing date. 193
Fixing the scope of an invention on a certain date is crucial to our patent
system.' 94 The filing date of a U.S. patent application is considered by the USPTO
as the prima facie date of the invention of the subject matter disclosed within the
application. 95 Without the imposition of the written description requirement, an
applicant "submitting a claim not entitled to the earlier filing date of the application
would enjoy a windfall vis a vis the prior art."' 96 Thus, the written description
requirement has come full circle from its earlier role in notifying the public of the
scope of the inventor's exclusive rights to its present role in the patent system, of
defining the scope of the patentee's invention in his possession as of the filing date.
C. The USPTO Written Description Interim Guidelines
1. The Necessity of Guidelines for Biotechnology Inventions
Subsequent to the Federal Circuit's most recent written description requirement
decision in Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly and Co.,'97 the
USPTO issued interim guidelines on June 15, 1998, to assist patent examiners in
their review of biotechnological patent applications for compliance with the written
description requirement.' 8 Since the addition of Lilly to the Fiers v. Revel'9
decision, scholars and commentators alike have argued that the rulings are a radical
191. Id.
192. Id. The Ruschig court concluded:
We have a specification which describes appellants' invention. The issue here is in no wise a question
of its compliance with section 112, it is a question of fact: Is the compound of claim 13 described
therein? Does the specification convey clearly to those skilled in the art, to whom it is addressed, in
any way, the information that appellants invented that specific compound? Having considered the
specification in the light that has been shed on it by all the arguments pro and con, we conclude that
it does not. Id. at 996.
193. See Vas-Cath v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (accepting the Ruschig concept of written
description without scrutiny of its bare origin).
194. Mueller, supra note 17, at 621.
195. Id. at 621-22. Technical developments made between the filing date of the application and the
succeeding claim presentation date would be excluded from the prior art applied against the claim. Id. at 622.
196. See id. at 622 (explaining that "absent written description scrutiny, a later-presented claim not truly
entitled to the earlier filing date of the application would be improperly examined against a smaller universe of
prior art than is legally available").
197. 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
198. Guidelines, supra note 18, at 32,639.
199. 984 F.2d 1164 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
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departure from traditional description requirement jurisprudence.2' In order to
address the concerns relating to the patenting of biotechnological inventions under
the new interim guidelines, the USPTO held public hearings on November 4,1998,
in Boston, Massachusetts, and November 6, 1998, in San Diego, California.01 The
USPTO also solicited written comments from the public regarding the following:
(1) whether the guidelines' methodology was accurate; (2) whether certain factors
should be considered in analyzing the sufficiency of the written description
requirement; (3) whether it would be appropriate to narrow the scope of the
guidelines to specific technologies, such as biotechnology; (4) whether processes
and/or product-by-process claims should be included in the scope of the guidelines;
and (5) whether the guidelines had any effect on pending applications and future
applications.m
As a result of oral testimony from the public hearings and the moderate public
response commenting on the guidelines, the USPTO recently revised the interim
guidelines on December 21, 1999, to reflect its current understanding of the written
description requirement.2 3 Because the content and form of the revised interim
guidelines differ substantially from the former interim guidelines, the USPTO has
requested a second round of notice and public comment.'
Recognizing the need for United States patent law to keep up with the fast-
paced scientific advances of the biotech industry, John J. Doll, Director of
Biotechnology Examination at USPTO, contends that the interim guidelines "have
become necessary to determine just how court decisions such as University of
California Regents v. Eli Lilly and Co. will affect the patent application process.
'' 205
Part V of this Comment establishes that these newly revised interim guidelines are
completely in accord with binding legal precedent.' Moreover, the revised interim
guidelines make a rejection under the written description requirement highly
200. Pitlick, supra note 17, at 209; see Mueller, supra note 16, at 633 (claiming that "Lilly obscures the
function and purpose of the written description requirement by unnecessarily restricting the manner in which
possession of a biotechnological invention can be conveyed"); see also Plimier, supra note 17, at 150 (asserting
that the incentive to invent may diminish since patent protection would now require a broad disclosure in
exchange for only narrow protection).
201. Request for Comments on Interim Guidelines for Examination of Patent Applications under 35
U.S.C.A. 112, 1 "Written Description" Requirement; Extension of Comment Period and Notice of Hearing, 63
Fed. Reg. 50,887 (1998). As of this writing, the final guidelines have yet to be implemented by the USPTO.
202. Guidelines, supra note 18, at 32,639. The written comments are available to the public for review
through the World Wide Web at <http.//www.uspto.gov>.
203. See Revised Guidelines, supra note 19, at 71,427 (stating that several major issues were raised from
the oral testimony and public written comments relating to the guidelines' scope, legal methodology, and content
of the biotech-specific examples). The USPTO noted that the majority of written comments were in favor of
issuing the written description requirement guidelines, however, with revisions. Id.
204. Id. at 71,428.
205. See Hoffert, supra note 4, at I (according to Doll, the Lilly decision "highlights the need for [patent]
applicants to provide as thorough a specification of the invention as possible").
206. See infra Part .B.4.a (finding that the revised interim guidelines are in complete accord with binding
legal precedent).
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unlikely because a strong presumption exists that the specification as filed provides
adequate written description support for the claimed invention.207 However,
adequate written description support requires that the patent applicant be in
possession of the claimed invention at the time of filing so that one skilled in the
art will be informed of the applicant's possession.0 3
2. The Scope of the Revised Interim Guidelines
Although this Comment focuses on the Federal Circuit's most recent
biotechnology decisions-Lilly, Fiers, and Amgen 2 -- relevant to the written
description requirement and enablement jurisprudence, the interim guidelines have
been rewritten in order to prevent the narrow application of the description
requirement to a single art. t0 The revised guidelines now encompass all
technologies by "articulat[ing] the law in a clear and technology neutral
[manner]. 211
3. The Effectiveness of the Revised Interim Guidelines
As the revised interim guidelines have only been in effect since December
1999, and with the final guidelines on hold at the USPTO, it is still too early in the
process to fairly access the overall effectiveness of the guidelines. However, it does
appear that because the guidelines are clearly presented and rely on cases among
a broad range of the arts, the applicant will be in a better position to comply with
the requisite written description requirement if he carefully scrutinizes the
disclosure made in the application before mailing it to the USPTO. In essence, these
new guidelines give the patent applicant insight into precisely how the examiner
will review an application, step-by-step, for compliance with the written description
requirement.212 However, Part V discusses how the "narrowing" effect of the recent
Lilly decision may cause the guidelines to pose an obstacle to the biotech industry's
receiving broad patent protection for its genetic inventions.13
207. Revised Guidelines, supra note 19, at 71,435.
208. Id.; see infra notes 233-51 and accompanying text (discussing the three ways in which possession may
be established).
209. See infra Part V.B (reviewing the trilogy of recent Federal Circuit decisions on the written description
requirement and enablement jurisprudence).
210. Revised Guidelines, supra note 19, at 71,428.
211. Id.
212. See infra Part V.B.4.b (analyzing the pros of having a standard set of guidelines in place during the
examination process).
213. See infra Part V.B.4.b (discussing the impact of the guidelines on the biotech industry).
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V. ANALYSIS OF THE USPTO GUIDELINES
A threshold issue of the new USPTO legislation is whether the meaning of
"written description" is changed in application by the guidelines. Because the
written description requirement is a creature of statutory law, enacted by the
Legislature and interpreted by the United States Supreme Court, the USPTO cannot
reshape written description jurisprudence through its own initiative to appease the
biotech industry and reduce its own workload.2"4 As such, the guidelines lack the
full force and effect of the law.2"5 Instead, these guidelines are designed to assist the
patent examiner "in analyzing claimed subject matter for compliance with
substantive law," the statutory written description requirement.21 6 Accordingly, as
revealed in later sections of this Comment,217 the USPTO appears to have remained
within its legal boundaries in issuing the revised interim written description
requirement guidelines. This section analyzes the pertinent parts of the revised
interim guidelines in the logical order that a patent examiner would follow in his
or her review of a patent application.2 8
A. Application of the Guidelines by a USPTO Examiner
A strong presumption exists that the specification of an application asfiled is
a sufficient written description of the claimed invention.21 9 In rejecting an original
claim for insufficient written description support, the USPTO examiner carries the
initial burden of producing evidence that demonstrates why one skilled in the art
would not know that the claims are supported by the written description.22° The
inquiry for compliance with the written description requirement is a question of fact
to be analyzed on a case-by-case basis. 22
214. See Hoffert, supra note 4, at 1 (noting that a few years ago the USPTO faced a huge backlog of patent
applications for expressed sequence tags (ESTs) still awaiting review and ultimately had to revise its application
process to work off the backlog). In an effort to expedite the review process, the USPTO now limits claims to ten
sequences per application, and requires ESTs sequences to "be submitted in a computer-readable format for
examination." Id.
215. Revised Guidelines, supra note 19, at 71,434.
216. See id. (stating that rejections based upon the substantive law are appealable).
217. See infra Part V.B.1-3 (analyzing three recent Federal Circuit decisions in light of the revised interim
guidelines).
218. See infra notes 219-57 and accompanying text (analyzing the revised interim guidelines in the logical
order that a patent examiner would follow in reviewing a patent application).
219. Revised Guidelines, supra note 19, at 71,435; see id. (adding that in the case of amended or new claims,
support for these type of claims must be shown by the applicant in the original disclosure).
220. Id.
221. Id.; see In re Wertheim, 541 F.2d 257, 262 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (stating that the inquiry is afactual one
that depends on the nature of the invention and the degree of knowledge conveyed to those skilled in the art by
the disclosure); see also In re Smith, 458 F.2d 1389, 1395 (C.C.P.A. 1972) ("Precisely how close [to the claimed
invention] the description must come to comply with § 112 must be left to a case-by-case development")
(emphasis added).
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1. Determine the Scope of the Claim
The first step in the analysis involves a determination of the scope of each
claim.2n This is accomplished by the examiner's separate analysis, giving each
claim its "broadest reasonable interpretation."tm To meet the requisite written
description requirement, the claim must be adequately described, in its entirety,
including all limitations of the preamble, the transitional phrase, and the body of the
claim.224 In evaluating each separate claim for its proper scope and meaning, the
examiner should determine whether "sufficient structures, acts, or functions" are
present.2m The examiner must not reject the applicant's written description because
of an exclusion of "definitions or details for well-established terms or procedures"
from the specification. m
2. Review of the Entire Application to Determine What the Applicant Has
Invented
The next step under the guidelines involves an evaluation as to whether the
patent application meets the written description requirement.2 7 As part of this
initial evaluation, the examiner reviews the claims and the complete specification,
including the "specific embodiments, figures, and sequence listings," in order to
determine the "essential identifying characteristic features" of the applicant's
invention.m In analyzing whether the written description requirement is satisfied,
the examiner must determine the correlation between what the applicant has
identified possession of and what the applicant has actually claimed in the
application.' 9 An inverse correlation generally exists between the predictability
level in the art and the amount of disclosure necessary to meet the written
description requirement.3" For instance, when a well-established correlation is
present between the structure and function in the art, the written description
requirement may be met through disclosure of the function alone because a person
skilled in the art would be able to reasonably predict the complete structure from
222. Revised Guidelines, supra note 19, at 71,435.
223. Id.; see, e.g., In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1053-54 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (adopting the view that claim
language should be given its broadest reasonable interpretation during prosecution).
224. Revised Guidelines, supra note 19, at 71,435; see Lockwood v. American Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565,
1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (noting that a claimed invention with all of its limitations must be described by the applicant
to show possession of that claimed invention).




229. See id. (stating that such review is "conducted from the standpoint of one [skilled] in the art at the time
the application was filed, and should include a determination of the field of the invention and the level of skill and
knowledge in the art").
230. Id.
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its function." l Furthermore, the specification does not require a detailed description
of information that is well known in the relevant art.z2
3. Determine Whether There Is Sufficient Written Description Support for
Each Claimed Species
Following a review of the application to determine what the applicant has
invented, the examiner progresses to the next level in the analysis which involves
a determination of whether there is sufficient written description support for each
claimed species to inform one skilled in the art that the applicant was in possession
of the claimed invention at the time the application was filed. 3 Specifically, with
respect to original claims tm possession may be established in one of three ways:
(1) actual reduction to practice; (2) disclosure of sufficiently detailed drawings; or
(3) disclosure of sufficiently detailed relevant identifying characteristics."
The analysis for each claim, limited to a single embodiment or species,z 6
involves a three-pronged inquiry23 7 First, the examiner must determine whether an
actual reduction to practice of the claimed invention is described in the
application. 238 An actual reduction to practice occurs if the specification shows that
an embodiment was constructed or a process was performed by the inventor that
satisfied all of the claim limitations, and that "the invention work[ed] for its
intended purpose."239 Second, if an actual reduction to practice is not described in
the application, the examiner must then determine if the inventor completed the
231. See id. at 71,439 (explaining that in the event there is no such correlation, predicting structure from
function is thereby highly unlikely, and in such a case, the written description requirement will not be met by
disclosing only the function); see also Eli Lilly and Co., 119 F.3d at 1568 (setting forth the proposition that a
definition by function does not suffice to define the genus because "it is only an indication of what the gene does,
rather than what it is.").
232. See, e.g., Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367,1384 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (stating
that information well known in the art is preferably omitted from a patent).
233. Revised Guidelines, supra note 19, at 71,435.
234. Although the revised interim guidelines also address amended claims, new claims, or claims seeking
entitlement to the benefit of an earlier filing or priority date under §§ 119, 120, or 365(c) of the Patent Act, this
Comment focuses on original claims. Please note that the usage of the term "claim(s)" throughout this Comment
means "original claim(s)," unless otherwise specified.
235. Revised Guidelines, supra note 19, at 71,435.
236. Id. In distinguishing the term "species" from "genus,' it is helpful to understand that the former is a
claim that is drawn to a "single disclosed embodiment or species," whereas the latter is a claim that "encompasses
two or more embodiments or species within the scope of the claim." Id. at 71,439.
237. Id. at 71,435-36.
238. Id. at 71,435.
239. Id.; see Estee Lauder Inc. v. L'Oreal S.A., 129 F.3d 588, 593 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("[A] reduction to
practice does not occur until the inventor has determined that the invention will work for its intended purpose.").
If the invention is a biological material, an actual reduction to practice is properly shown by "specifically
describing a deposit made in accordance with the requirements of 37 C.F.R. § 1.801 et seq." Revised Guidelines,
supra note 19, at 71,435.
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invention by evaluating a reduction of drawings.240 The disclosure of sufficiently
detailed drawings may provide an adequate written description.2 41 Finally, if the
first two prongs are not satisfied, the examiner proceeds to the third prong to
determine if any "distinguishing identifying characteristics" of the invention are
present.
242
The third prong presents two further hurdles, and the successful applicant must
bypass at least one in order to avoid a rejection under the written description
requirement.243 Regarding the first hurdle, the examiner determines whether the
complete structure of the claimed invention in its entirety is described by the
application as filed.244 The description requirement is generally satisfied with the
disclosure of a complete structure of a species or embodiment, making rejection for
lack of written description improper.245
If the application as filed fails to disclose a complete structure, the claimed
species is automatically considered under the second hurdle, requiring the examiner
to determine whether the specification discloses other "relevant identifying
characteristics." 246 The written description requirement is satisfied if the disclosure
of any such combination of distinguishing identifying characteristics would inform
a skilled artisan that the claimed species was in possession of the applicant.
247
However, the final inquiry into whether the specification evidences that the claimed
invention was in the possession of the applicant is reached through the weighing of
several factors, as opposed to a single factual determination: (1) the "level of skill
and knowledge in the art" (i.e., predictability of the art); (2) "partial structure,
physical and/or chemical properties"; (3) "functional characteristics alone or
coupled with a known or disclosed correlation between structure and function"; and
(4) the "method of making the claimed invention.,
248
Unlike mature technologies in which the knowledge and skill in the art is
relatively high, emergirg and unpredictable technologies, such as the
biotechnological arts, require additional evidence to demonstrate possession.249
Thus, an applicant who discloses a partial structure without further characterization
of the product generally falls to prove the claimed invention."
240. Revised Guidelines, supra note 19, at 71,435.
241. See id. at 71,439 (noting that this is particularly true in the case of the mechanical and electrical arts).
242. Id. at 71,435.
243. Id. at 71,435-36.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 71,435-36.
247. Id. at 71,436.
248. See id. (adding that in determining the maturity of the art as well as the knowledge and skill in the art,
the examiner may rely on patents and other printed publications relating to the relevant art).
249. Id.
250. Id.; see Amgen v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1206 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ("It is not sufficient to
define [the gene] solely by its principal biological property, e.g., encoding human erythropoietin, because an
alleged conception having no more specificity than that is simply a wish to know the identity of any material with
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In sum, the examiner must reject any claim to a species that fails to satisfy any
of the three prongs of the possession test for lack of adequate written description
under the Patent Act.25'
4. Determine Whether There Is Sufficient Written Description Support for
Each Claimed Genus
Reaching the next step, the examiner performs an analysis that is similar to the
above analysis for each claimed species, except this time, the reviewer considers
whether there is sufficient written description support to inform one skilled in the
art that the applicant was in possession of the claimed genus at the time of filing.z 2
To arrive at this determination, each claim to a genus is subjected to the same three-
pronged possession test as used for each claim drawn to a species described
above.z3 Accordingly, the applicant is in possession of the claimed genus and thus
satisfies the written description requirement if he or she provides a sufficient
description of a "representative number of species" under one of the three prongs
of the possession test.2
5. Complete the Determination of Patentability Under All Statutory
Requirements of the Patent Act
The discussion above only represents the step-by-step analysis that an examiner
must follow in determining whether the written description requirement is met.
Notwithstanding the outcome of the description requirement inquiry, the USPTO
examiner must complete the determination of patentability under all relevant
statutes, including sections 101-103 of the Patent Act.255 After a complete analysis
of the claimed invention under all pertinent statutory provisions, the examiner may
then review all the proposed rejections and, if substantiated by his or her findings
and conclusions, execute an appropriate rejection in an official "Office Action. ' z 6
Finally, after receipt of the Office Action and subsequent reply by the applicant, the
that biological property.").
251. Revised Guidelines, supra note 19, at 71,436.
252. Id.
253. See supra text accompanying notes233-51 (explaining the three-pronged possession test for each claim
drawn to a species).
254. Revised Guidelines, supra note 19, at 71,436 (defining "representative number of species" as "the
species which are adequately described are representative of the entire genus"). In the unpredictable
biotechnological arts, the disclosure of only one species within the genus, which consists of a variety of species,
fails to provide adequate written description support. Id. However, it is not necessary that the description be of
such specificity as to require individual support for each species within the genus. Id.
255. Id.; see supra Part L.B. 1-3 (providing an overview of the three-pronged inquiry for patentability under
United States patent law for novelty, nonobviousness, and utility).
256. Revised Guidelines, supra note 19, at 71,436; see id. (noting that "helpful suggestions on overcoming
any rejections should be included in the Office action whenever possible").
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examiner must repeat the above process in light of the entire record to determine
the patentability of the claimed invention.'
B. Implications of the Guidelines on the Biotechnology Industry in Light of
Recent Federal Circuit Court Decisions
In order to fully understand the effect that these new guidelines will have on the
future of the biotech industry, it is essential to consider the guidelines in light of the
Federal Circuit's most recent description requirement and enablement decisions.
Three landmark decisions have determined the fate of the written description
requirement with respect to acquiring future gene patents in the biotechnological
arts.2  As will become apparent in this discussion, the revised interim guidelines
fully reflect the analysis of these Federal Circuit decisions."s9 Therefore, the
USPTO did not overstep legal boundaries in drafting the written description
guidelines.2 °
1. Amgen v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co.
The Federal Circuit decision of Amgen v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co.,261 in the
early 1990s, was pivotal in mapping the direction of the modem written description
requirement as applied to future patent applications for biotech inventions.
AlthoughAmgen is an enablement decision involving the issue of whether Amgen's
patent was invalid under section 102(g) of the Patent Act over the prior invention
of another,262 the Federal Circuit has subsequently used the reasoning of Amgen in
determining the sufficiency of the written description requirement for patent
applications claiming gene sequences.'
The patent owned by Amgen claimed a purified and isolated DNA sequence,
encoding the human gene erythropoietin (EPO).2 6 Defendant Chugai alleged that
one Fritsch was the first to conceive' a particular strategy that was ultimately
257. Id.
258. See infra Part V.B.1-3 (discussing Amgen, Revel, and Eli Lilly and Co.).
259. See infra text accompanying notes 318-22 (concluding that the revised interim guidelines are in accord
with Amgen, Revel, and Eli Lilly and Co.).
260. See infra text accompanying note 318 (stating that the USPTO was within legal boundaries in drafting
the written description guidelines).
261. 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
262. Id. at 1205-06. Other issues addressed by the Federal Circuit on appeal include patent infringement
and inequitable conduct concerning two patents, one owned by Amgen and the other by Genetics Institute, a co-
defendant with Chugai. Id. at 1202.
263. Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
264. Amgen, 927 F2d at 1203-04.
265. The term "conception" as used in the patent context is defined as the "'formation in the mind of the
inventor, of a definite and permanent idea of the complete and operative invention, as it is hereafter to be applied
in practice."'Id at 1206 (quoting Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1376 (Fed. Cir,
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found by the district court to result "in the successful identification and isolation of
the EPO gene. ,26 Asserting that Fritsch had conceived the strategy prior to
Amgen's invention, Chugai further argued that the inventor was diligent in reducing
the invention to practice, and therefore, he should be considered a prior inventor
over Anagen under section 102(g) of the Patent Act.267 The Federal Circuit
disagreed with Chugai's argument and held that conception is not achieved prior to
reduction to practice.m According to the court, conception may be properly
claimed once the isolation of the gene (i.e., reduction to practice) has occurred.20
Conception is not achieved without the precondition of reduction to practice,
because an inventor may have difficulty envisioning the composition of a gene to
sufficiently distinguish it from other such materials, or a method for obtaining the
gene.270 In so holding, the court noted that although Fritsch's goal was to obtain the
isolated EPO gene, and he had even developed an idea of a potential method for
obtaining it, a purified and isolated DNA sequence encoding human EPO and an
acceptable method for obtaining it was not conceived by Fritsch until after
Amgen 7 ' Furthermore, the conception of a process must be sufficiently specific
in order to enable a skilled artisan in the relevant art to clone the human EPO
gene.272 The Federal Circuit concluded that Fritsch clearly did not establish
conception because he had no knowledge of the structure of EPO or the EPO gene
itselfY
3
2. Fiers v. Revel
Fiers v. Revel274 is the next pertinent Federal Circuit decision affecting the
written description requirement. The Revel decision involved a three-way
interference proceeding 5 among three foreign inventors with respect to a single
1986)).
266. Id. at 1205.
267. Id. at 1205-06.




272. Id. at 1207.
273. Id. Note that it is important to clarify that neither party, Fritsch nor Amgen, actually invented EPO or
the human EPO gene. Id. at 1206. Rather, the subject matter of the claim at issue was "the novel purified and
isolated sequence which codes for EPO, and neither [party] knew of the structure or physical characteristics of
[the gene] and had a viable method of obtaining that subject matter until it was actually obtained and
characterized." Id. (emphasis added).
274. 984 F.2d 1164 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
275. See 35 U.S.C.A. § 135(a) (West Supp. 1999) (explaining an interference proceeding in pertinent part:
Whenever an application is made for a patent, which, in the opinion of the Commissioner, would
interfere with any pending application, or with any unexpired patent, an interference may be declared
and the Commissioner shall give notice of such declaration to the applicants, or applicant and patentee,
as the case may be. The Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences shall determine questions of priority
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count of a DNA coding for human fibroblast interferon-beta polypeptide
276(<<beta>>-IF), a protein promoting "viral resistance in human tissue."27 7 United
States patent applications were filed by the various parties in the following manner:
(1) Sugano filed on October 27, 1980, and claimed the benefit of his earlier
Japanese filing date of March 19, 1980; (2) Fiers filed on April 3, 1981, and sought
to establish the requisite priority under section 102(g) of the Patent Act "based on
prior conception coupled with diligence up to his [earlier] British filing date [of]
April 3, 1980"; and (3) Revel filed on September 28, 1982, and claimed the benefit
of his earlier Israeli filing date of November 21, 1979.278
Prior to reaching the Federal Circuit on appeal, however, the USPTO Board of
Patent Appeals and Interferences determined the issue of priority during the
interference proceeding in favor of Sugano, and hence concluded that Sugano was
entitled to the benefit of his earlier Japanese filing date.279 The Board reasoned that
Sugano was awarded priority of invention over the other inventors because a
complete and correct sequence of the DNA coding for <<beta>>-IF was disclosed
in his Japanese application, as well as a disclosure detailing the method used by
Sugano in obtaining the DNA.20 The Federal Circuit affirmed the Board's
determination that Sugano's application provided sufficient written description
support because his disclosure conveyed with reasonable clarity to one of ordinary
skill in the relevant art that Sugano was in possession of the nucleotide sequence."
In view of the procedural history above, Circuit Judge Lourie first analyzed
Fiers' case for priority of invention. 2 Fiers' case for priority was allegedly based
on prior conception derived from a protocol consisting of a proposed method for
isolating a DNA coding for <<beta>>-IF, brought to the United States from abroad,
"coupled with diligence toward a constructive reduction to practice" on the date that
"he filed a British application disclosing the complete nucleotide sequence of a
DNA coding for <<beta>>-IF.'2 3 The record indicated that an earlier draft patent
application included the protocol which embodied Friers' method for isolating the
<<beta>>-IF sequence, but "not the nucleotide sequence for the DNA."2  Relying
of the inventions and may determine questions of patentability. Any final decision, if adverse to the
claim of an applicant, shall constitute the final refusal by the Patent and Trademark Office of the
claims involved, and the Commissioner may issue a patent to the applicant who is adjudged the prior
inventor.).
276. To ease readability of the text, this Comment adopts the Revel court's use of the "short-hand" notation
for the human fibroblast beta-interferon protein throughout the discussion of the subject case.
277. Fiers v. Revel, 984 E2d at 1166.
278. Id. at 1167.
279. Id. at 1167-68.
280. Id. at 1171.
281. Id. at 1172.
282. Id. at 1168.
283. Id. at 1167.
284. Id. (emphasis added).
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on Amgen,285 the Board held that since conception was not established in the U.S.
before Fiers' British filing date, Fiers was only entitled to the date of his British
application, a month later than Sugano's Japanese priority date.286
On appeal, Fiers sought to distinguish Amgen based on the argument that Fiers
had an enabling disclosure that would allow one of ordinary skill in the art to
effortlessly carry out his method whereas in Amgen, Fritsch had no such disclosure
in his respective application.287 Additionally, Fiers argued that under Amgen's
holding, if a DNA is defined by its method of preparation, then a conception may
occur. 8 The Federal Circuit flatly rejected each one of Fiers' arguments and
attempts to distinguish Amgen.2s9 "[I]rrespective of the complexity or simplicity of
the method of isolation employed, conception of a DNA, like conception of any
chemical substance, requires a definition of that substance other than by its
functional utility."29° Accordingly, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board's
determination that Fiers had an entitlement only to the benefit of his British filing
date because no conception of the DNA at issue had occurred before that date.29
With respect to Revel's case for priority, the Federal Circuit applied the clearly
erroneous standard to the Board's decision that Revel's Israeli application failed to
adequately disclose a written description of a DNA coding for <<beta>>-IF.2 92 The
Board concluded that because there was no disclosure of the nucleotide sequence
or "'an intact complete gene' of the DNA at issue, the requisite written description
requirement was not satisfied.293 In reaching its holding, the Board set forth a test
for sufficiency of written description support that asks "whether the disclosure of
the application relied upon 'reasonably conveys to the artisan that the inventor had
possession at that time of the later claimed subject matter."' 294 According to the
Board, Revel's Israeli application failed to satisfy that test because it did not include
a disclosure of the gene sequence that would reasonably convey to one of ordinary
skill in the art that Revel was in possession of the DNA at issue.
295
285. See supra notes 268-73 and accompanying text (setting forth the holding reached by the Federal Circuit
in Amgen).
286. Revel, 984 F.2d at 1168.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 1169; see id. (providing that the controlling issue is not whether Fiers' method was enabling, but
rather is whether a DNA coding for <<beta>>-IF was, in fact, conceived by Fiers as he was attempting to claim
priority under § 102(g) of the Patent Act).
290. Id. (emphasis added). "Conception ofa substance claimed per se without reference to a process requires
conception of its structure, name, formula, or definitive chemical or physical properties." Id.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 1171. The determination of whether the written description requirement has been met is a
question of fact; as such, decisions of the lower district courts and the Board are reviewed on appeal under a
clearly erroneous standard. Id. at 1170.
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The Federal Circuit held that the Board's decision was not clearly erroneous. 2
Reaffirming Amgen, the Revel court articulated important principles relating to the
sufficiency of the written description requirement.27 "An adequate written
description of a DNA requires more than a mere statement that it is part of the
invention and reference to a potential method for isolating it; what is required is a
description of the DNA itself."'298 Disclosure of a clone that may possibly be used
in a method for obtaining mRNA coding for <<beta>>-IF illustrates inadequate
written description support because such description does not show that the
disclosed method even leads to the DNA in issue.2" Thus, the court concluded that
"[ilf a conception of a DNA requires a precise definition, such as by structure,
formula, chemical name, or physical properties, as we have held [in Amgen], then
a description also requires that degree of specificity." 300 In effect, the Revel court
used the reasoning of Amgen, in which conception was at issue, and expanded it to
demand the same high degree of specificity for compliance with the written
description requirement.
30'
3. Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly and Co.
Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly and Co.3°W is the Federal
Circuit's most recent landmark decision involving the written description
requirement. In Lilly, the Regents of the University of California (UC), holder of
two patents relating to recombinant DNA technology and "to recombinant plasmids
and microorganisms that produce human insulin," brought an infringement action
against Eli Lilly and Co. (Lilly), a manufacturer of human insulin.0 3 Although the
Federal Circuit addressed numerous issues on appeal, this section will focus only
on the issue of validity as to the first patent, U.S. Patent 4,652,525 (the '525
patent),G4 for compliance with the statutory written description requirement.
Regardless of the fact that the specification of the '525 patent provided
sufficient written description support of rat insulin cDNA, the district court held
that all of the claims allegedly infringed by Lilly were invalid under section 112,
paragraph one, of the Patent Act because the specification failed to provide
sufficient written description support of human insulin cDNA as prescribed by the
296. Id. at 1171.
297. Id. at 1170-71.
298. ld. at 1170.
299. See id. at 1171 (stating that "[a] bare reference to a DNA with a statement that it can be obtained by
reverse transcription is not a description; it does not indicate that Revel was in possession of the DNA").
300. Id. (emphasis added).
301. See supra text accompanying notes 268-73 (discussing the reasoning of Amgen).
302. 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
303. Id. at 1562.
304. Specifically, UC alleged that Lilly had infringed claims 1, 2, and 4-7 of the '525 patent. Id. For a
detailed summary of the '525 patent claims, see id.
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claims at issue?" 5 At trial, UC set forth two primary arguments which the Federal
Circuit eventually struck down on review of the record.306 First, UC argued that the
district court was clearly erroneous in concluding that claim 5 was invalid for lack
of a written description because according to UC, a constructive example in the
specification disclosed a detailed description of a method for preparing the claimed
recombinant procaryotic microorganism.0 7 Second, UC claimed that the district
court erred in finding that the cDNA encoding mammalian and vertebrate insulin
were not sufficiently described in the specification. 30 8 UC asserted that the
description of a species of both genera within the respective genera included in the
'525 specification was sufficient to satisfy the written description requirement."
In response to UC's first argument, the Lilly court disagreed, reasoning as
follows:
The name cDNA is not itself a written description of that DNA; it conveys
no distinguishing information concerning its identity. While the example
provides a process for obtaining human insulin-encoding cDNA, there is
no further information in the patent pertaining to that cDNA's relevant
structural or physical characteristics; in other words, it thus does not
describe human insulin cDNA. Describing a method of preparing a cDNA
or even describing the protein that the cDNA encodes, as the example does,
does not necessarily describe the cDNA itself. No sequence information
indicating which nucleotides constitute human cDNA appears in the patent,
as appears for rat cDNA in [the] [e]xample of the patent.3 "
Therefore, the Federal Circuit affirmed the lower court in holding that claim 5 was
invalid for lack of an adequate written description.
311
The Lilly court also found no logical basis for UC's second argument. 2
Relying significantly on its earlier Fiers v. Reve 31 decision, the Federal Circuit
affirmed the district court's ruling that claims 1, 2, 4, 6, and 7 were invalid for lack
of an adequate written description in the '525 specification.3 14 A three-judge panel
305. Id. at 1566-67 (emphasis added).
306. See id. at 1567 (setting forth UC's two primary arguments at trial).
307. Id. Claim 5 of UC's '525 patent is dependent on Claim 2 (a "recombinant procaryotic microorganism
containing vertebrate insulin-encoding cDNA"), and is limited to human insulin cDNA. Id. at 1563.
308. Id. at 1567.
309. Id. at 1568.
310. Id. at 1567.
311. Id.
312. See id. at 1568 (disagreeing with UC's argument that the claims are valid); see also supra notes 308-09
and accompanying text (setting forth UC's second argument).
313. 984 F.2d 1164 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
314. Eli Lilly and Co., 119 F.3d at 1569. With respect to claims 1. 2, 4, 6, and 7 of UC's '525 patent:
Claim 1 ... reads as follows: "A recombinant plasmid replicable in procaryotic host containing within
is nucleotide sequence a subsequence having the structure of the reverse transcript of an mRNA of a
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of the Federal Circuit applied the "precise definition" test, for genetic inventions
provided in Revel, to the present claims in the following manner:
In claims to genetic material, a generic statement such as "vertebrate
insulin cDNA" or "mammalian insulin cDNA," without more, is not an
adequate written description of the genus because it does not distinguish
the claimed genus from others, except by function. It does not specifically
define any of the genes that fall within its definition. It does not define any
structural features commonly possessed by members of the genus that
distinguish them from others. One skilled in the art therefore, cannot, as
one can do with a fully described genus, visualize or recognize the identity
of the members of the genus. A definition by function.., does not suffice
to define the genus because it is only an indication of what the gene does,
rather than what it is.
315
Thus, in order to define a genus and meet the requisite written description
requirement for biotech inventions, the precise definition test, as articulated by the
Lilly Court, demands that the specification provide a structure, formula, or chemical
name of the subject matter claimed that is sufficient to distinguish it from other
members of the genus.1 6 Without the heightened specificity requirement, a genus
defined entirely by function fails to establish an adequate written description of the
specification.317
4. After Amgen, Revel, and Lilly: The Implications of the Guidelines on
the Biotechnology Industry
a. The Legality of the Guidelines in Light of Federal Circuit Precedent
Prior to discussing the effect that the new USPTO undertaking will have on the
biotech industry with respect to the filing of gene patents by prospective patentees,
it is important to first address the legality of the guidelines. A careful reading of the
vertebrate, which mRNA encodes insulin." Claim 2 relates to a recombinant procaryotic
microorganism containing vertebrate insulin-encoding cDNA. Claim 4... depend[s] from claim 2, and
[is] limited... to mammalian ... insulin cDNA. Claim 6 depends from claim 1 and requires that the
plasmid contain "at least one genetic determinant of the plasmid col El." Claim 7 depends from claim
2 and requires that the microorganism be of a particular strain.
Id.
315. Id. at 1568 (citing Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1169-71 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
316. Id. The following represents the primary ways in which a description of a genus of cDNAs may be
appropriately defined under the precise definition premise: (1) "a recitation of a representative number of cDNAs,
defined by nucleotide sequence, falling within the scope of the genus"; or (2) "a recitation of structural features
common to members of the genus, which features constitute a substantial portion of the genus." Id. at 1569.
317. Id. at 1569
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guidelines in light of several key Federal Circuit decisions reveals that the USPTO
indeed has accomplished the difficult task of drafting these guidelines to be
consistent with controlling legal precedent. While drafting guidelines to encompass
a broad range of technology, the USPTO was able to ultimately produce a legally
consistent product.
38
Specifically, in the context of the biotechnological arts relevant to this
Comment, the guidelines clearly incorporate the Lilly court's heightened "precise
definition" standard in requiring evidence of possession of a claimed gene for
compliance with the written description requirement.319 The guidelines proclaim
that the disclosure of a partial structure, without further characterization of the
product, typically fails to establish the requisite possession of the claimed invention
and thus does not satisfy the statutory description requirement. 320 Furthermore,
throughout the text of the guidelines, the USPTO cites several key court decisions
for important legal principles in order to support its methodology.32t In particular,
the USPTO references two earlier CCPA decisions for the guiding principle that,
at the outset of the examination process, the determination of whether the written
description requirement has been met is a question of fact that is analyzed on a
case-by-case basis by USPTO personnel. 322 For the reasons above, the USPTO
appears to have drafted the guidelines in a manner that is consistent with legal
precedent.
b. Will the Revised Interim Guidelines Impede the Patent Application
Process for the Biotechnology Industry?
With the revised interim guidelines currently in effect, the biotech industry is
now faced with many uncertainties as to how the guidelines will affect the
acquisition of future gene patents in the next few years. Do the guidelines favor the
other technologies, such as the electrical and mechanical arts? Will the guidelines
make it more difficult for the biotech industry to obtain future gene patents as a
318. Note that these newly revised interim guidelines are subject to change in the near future due to the fact
that the USPTO has requested a second round of notice and public comment on the guidelines. See text
accompanying note 204 (explaining the reason for the USFTO's request). As of this writing, the date of
implementation for the final written description requirement guidelines has not been established by the USPTO.
319. See Revised Guidelines, supra note 19, at 71,435-36 (stating that possession may be shown by
sufficiently describing "relevant identifying characteristics" in the specification such that one with skill in the
relevant art would know of the inventor's possession).
320. See supra notes 249-50 and accompanying text (explaining that additional evidence is necessary in the
unpredictable technologies, such as biotechnology, in order to show possession of the claimed invention).
321. See Revised Guidelines, supra note 19, at 71,437-40 (listing numerous court decisions in the endnotes
for support of the USPTO's revised interim guidelines).
322. See supra note 219-221 and accompanying text (establishing the legal foundation in which the
examiner is to follow in his or her review of a patent specification for compliance with the written description
requirement).
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result of the Lilly decision? Are the guidelines contrary to public policy? 323
Notwithstanding the above uncertainties, this Comment first examines the
advantages of having a standard set of guidelines in place during the examination
process.
First, the guidelines provide the patent applicant and a company's in-house
patent counsel with substantial insight into the patent application process itself;
step-by-step, the applicant and counsel will know exactly what must be disclosed
in order to comply with the written description requirement.324 In effect, the
guidelines enable such persons to "get inside the head" of the particular USPTO
examiner. Since the guidelines provide significant insight into exactly how an
application is reviewed, in-house counsel will be more informed of the internal
workings and nuances of the USPTO examination process. Hence they will likely
be able to prosecute more patent applications in less time on behalf of the company.
Thus, the guidelines enable the biotech company to realize increased productivity
and cost savings in the long run.
Second, there is a benefit to applying the guidelines to many technologies rather
than biotechnology alone. With the Lilly decision aside, a standard set of guidelines
for reviewing a broad range of technologies saves the biotechnological arts from the
narrow application of patent law principles. For example, as discussed more fully
below, a narrow patent for a gene invention is of little worth to the inventor in most
cases. For instance, by slightly altering the gene sequence, a competitor can make
a potentially patentable product and save significant research costs, passing those
savings on to the consumer through a less expensive product.3 s Thus, the
biotechnological arts can only benefit from a broad application of the guidelines.
326
Despite the two primary benefits of the guidelines, 327 uncertainty as to whether
the guidelines will impede the patent application process for the biotech industry
presents an obstacle to the guidelines' beneficial effects. Critics argue that because
the guidelines incorporate Lilly's ruling, the scientist-inventor will no longer have
an incentive to invent.3 Under the Lilly holding, gene patents are only granted very
323. See infra Part V.D (discussing whether the revised interim guidelines are contrary to public policy).
324. By no means, the issue of disclosure with respect to satisfying the written description requirement is
not intended to be trivialized. In the unpredictable arts, such as biotechnology, knowing exactly what must be
disclosed is not an easy determination, even in light of case-law.
325. See infra notes 328-33 and accompanying text (illustrating the "no incentive to invent" policy
argument).
326. But see supra notes 328-33 and accompanying text (commenting that the guidelines arguably apply
narrow patent principles to gene patents since such guidelines are in accord with Federal Circuit precedent,
including Lilly).
327. See supra notes 324-26 and accompanying text (explicating the benefits of having a standard set of
guidelines in place during patent prosecution).
328. See Mueller, supra note 17, at 651 (arguing that Lilly's per se rle of specificity "surely reduces
incentives to invest in innovation by depriving potential patentees of the opportunity to fully benefit from their
research"). For the purposes of this Comment, th- employee/scientist-inventor of a biotech company generally
upon employment signs a writing to the effect that he or she agrees to assign all rights in the invention over to the
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narrow protection. 29 Such narrow protection "held to be only as broad as the
specific DNA nucleotide sequence disclosed," is of no practical value to the
inventor.3  With just a minor alteration of the DNA sequence, competitors can
"produce" such a product while saving significant amounts of money on research
and development costs. The competing biotech company is then able to charge less
for the price of its new product as a result of the lower research costs. 33 ' In effect,
a competitor is able to easily avoid an infringement suit and save research costs by
slightly altering the patented gene sequence. 32 The end result from this chain of
events will likely lead to a slowdown of biotechnology progress because the
scientist-inventor will have no incentive to invent if research costs cannot be
recovered through patent protection.333
The USPTO guidelines' compliance with the Lilly court's heightened standard
could have a potentially detrimental effect on the biotech industry. Until the
cumulative impact of Lilly is known in the next couple of years, it is difficult to
predict with certainty whether this sound argument will become a reality for the
biotech industry. In the meantime, the biotech industry has no choice other than to
comply with these Federal Circuit decisions, which have stirred up some debate in
the patent field regarding the disclosure necessary to demonstrate sufficient written
description support for genetic engineering inventions. Thus, at the moment, the
biotech industry is caught in a "catch-22" situation; while the industry strives to
achieve broad patent protection for its gene products by drafting broad claims, it
will likely only be granted narrow protection for such inventions as promulgated
by the new Lilly standard.
C. Comparison to the "Written Description" Approach of the European
Biotechnology Directive
While some Member States of the European Union, such as Great Britain, have
employer. As a result, the biotech company receives an assignment of the original inventor's invention and is now
the "owner." See 35 U.S.C.A. § 261 (West 1984) (providing that "applications for patent, patents, or any interest
therein, shall be assignable in law by an instrument in writing").
329. See Plimier, supra note 17, at 159 (noting that "[w]ith the difference of four codons out of over a
hundred meaning the difference between infringement and non-infringement, [Lilly] gives only very narrow
protection to genetic engineering patents"). Human insulin cDNA varies from rat insulin cDNA by only four
codons. Regents of the Univ. of California v. Eli Lilly and Co., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d 1225, 1241 (S.D. Ind. 1995); see
supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text (describing the function of "codons" as a group of three DNA
nucleotides, that code for an amino acid).
330. Plimier, supra note 17, at 159.
331. Id.
332. Mueller, supra note 17, at 651.
333. Piimier, supra note 17, at 159. This particular policy argument should be of great concern to
California's biotech industry, as the three largest biotech companies of the U.S. are headquartered in that state.
See Giantruco, supra note 36, at 128 (highlighting the net revenues ofthree of the largest U.S. biotech companies,
all of which are located in California-Arngen, Chiron, and Genentech).
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condoned the patenting of biological inventions, most European nations have lacked
consistency and have not offered the extent of protection provided by the patent
laws of the United States and Japan. 33 This confusion in the European community
concerning protection for biotechnology inventions was furthered by the European
Patent Office (EPO) when it issued seemingly inconsistent opinions involving the
patentability of genetically engineered animals and plants.
In 1985, an original proposal was created with the purpose of harmonizing the
patenting of biotechnological inventions throughout the Member European
nations.33 The first Biotechnology Directive was finally proposed in 1993, and had
garnered support from many biotechnology companies that lobbied extensively
throughout Europe for the legislation.337 However, this initial Directive was strongly
opposed by various groups.338 Environmentalists criticized its similarity to United
States patent law because it allowed the patenting of "discoveries" in addition to
"inventions," and because it condoned "the mining or 'piracy' by developed
countries of useful species in less developed, but more biodiverse, parts of the
world.' 339 Ethicists expressed concern over its failure to adequately discourage
research on human tissue and human embryos by proscribing the patentability of
inventions in such areas.3 Ultimately, these opposing arguments proved successful
in convincing the Parliament of the European Union to veto the initial Directive in
1995 .31
Since 1995, the European Biotechnology Directive has endured several
revisions in order to address these critical environmental and ethical concerns 42
Three years after its initial rejection in 1995, the long awaited Biotechnology
334. European Parliament Approves Biotechnology Patent Law, 10 J. PROPRIETARY RTs. 20 (1998)
[hereinafter European Parliament]; see also Darrell G. Dotson, Comment, The European Controversy Over
Genetic-Engineering Patents, 19 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 919 (1997) (illustrating the increased frustration felt by
European biotechnology companies over the confused state of Europe's patent regulations).
335. Hans-Rainer Jaenichen, Is It Possible to Patent Transgenic Animals and Transgenic Plants in the
European Patent Office After the Technical Board's Decision T35693, "Plant Cells/Plant Genetic Systems"?,
14 BIOTECH. L REP. 545, 561 (1995).
336. Robin Nott, "You Did It!": The European Biotechnology Directive At Last, 9 E.I.P.R. 347, 347 (1998).
337. European Parliament, supra note 334, at 20.
338. See infra text accompanying notes 338-40 (explaining that the two groups in strong opposition to the
initial Directive were environmentalists and ethicists).
339. Id.
340. Id.; see Amy E. Carroll, Comment, Not Always the Best Medicine: Biotechnology and the Global
Impact of U.S. Patent Law, 44 AM. U.L RE. 2433,2464 (1995) (explicating that "while most long-industrialized
nations have historically maintained that liberally granting and stringently enforcing [intellectual property (IP)]
rights promotes growth and a strong domestic economy, developing nations have failed to appreciate fully the
benefits of such an IP system"). Because of the long-term and tenuous nature of the benefits of a patent system,
developing countries assert that the implementation of stronger patent laws is not in their present economic
interest. Id. See Alan S. Gutterman, The North-South Debate Regarding the Protection of Intellectual Property
Rights, 28 WAKE FORES L. REV. 89, 136-37 (concluding that "it has become evident that expanded protection
of IP rights is not sensible for all countries").
341. European Parliament, supra note 334, at 20.
342. Id.
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Directive was implemented among the European Union countries on July 30,
1998. 3
The Directive opens with Recitals that recognize the increasingly important role
that biotechnology and genetic engineering play among a broad range of
industries?" Acknowledging the significance of these areas to the industrial
development of the European Community, the Directive further proclaims the
fundamental importance of protecting such biotechnological inventions.3s
Specifically, in the field of genetic engineering, which requires a substantial amount
of high-risk investment to perform the necessary research and development,
adequate legal protection of an invention is essential for the industries to net a
profitY 6 Hence, a primary goal of the Directive is to effectively harmonize patent
protection throughout the Member States in order to maintain and encourage
investment in the biotechnology industry.3 7 Thus, the Directive provides patent
protection in all European Union countries for most biotechnological inventions,
including "human and non-human-derived gene sequences and cell-lines and
transgenic plants and animals."'
Under the European Biotechnology Directive, Recitals 22 through 24 embody
a "written description" requirement for comparison with United States patent law.
In particular, Recital 23 of the Directive proclaims that "a mere DNA sequence
without indication of a function does not contain any technical information and is
therefore not a patentable invention. ' '349 Unlike United States patent law, which
requires either disclosure of the structure or other relevant identifying
characteristics,350 the Directive seems to summarily reject any claim of a DNA
sequence that fails to disclose its respective function. In other words, disclosure of
the structure of a gene sequence alone would not be sufficient under the new
Directive to provide support for a patent. 5' In this respect, the USPTO guidelines
343. See Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 on the Legal
Protection of Biotechnological Inventions, art. 17, 1998 OJ. (L 213) 13,21 [hereinafter European Biotechnology
Directive] (providing the effective date of the Directive as the day of its publication in the Official Journal of the
European Communities). Under Article 15, the necessary laws, regulations and administrative provisions shall
be brought into force by the Member States so as to comply with the Directive no later than July 30,2000. Id.
344. Id., recital 1.
345. id.
346. Id., recital 2.
347. Id., recital 3.
348. See R. Binns & B. Driscoll, The European Directive on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological
Inventions, GENE THERAPY WKLY., Feb. 1, 1999 (noting that certain biotechnological inventions will not be
patentable because of morality concerns, including "processes for human cloning or germ line gene therapy,
certain uses of human embryos, certain transgenic animals and human/animal chimeras").
349. European Biotechnology Directive, supra note 343, at 13.
350. See supra notes 233-51 and accompanying text (discussing the appropriate steps of the guidelines in
determining whether there is sufficient written description support for each claimed species).
351. Recital 22 of the European Biotechnology Directive states that gene sequences are subject to three
criteria for patentability: novelty, inventive step, and industrial application. The Directive's three-step approach
for patentability is similar to the three-pronged inquiry for patentability under the United States Patent Act:
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are different from the European Biotechnology Directive.
D. Does Unique Biotech-Specific Patent Law Treatment Contravene Public
Policy?
The trilogy of recent Federal Circuit biotech decisions-Amgen, Revel, and
Lilly-represents the decade-long development throughout the 1990s of "unique
patent law jurisprudence for genetic engineering inventions." '352 Because uniform
standards broadly encompassing all technologies are generally favored by public
policy, concern is raised when patent law principles are narrowly focused on a
particular technology, such as biotechnology.353 As a result of the Lilly decision,
practitioners and scholars alike have argued that this most recent interpretation of
the written description requirement by the Federal Circuit has led to a chilling effect
on the development of new biotech inventions."54 In particular, such individuals
have advanced two key policy arguments in some form or another, with regard to
the future implications of Lilly on the biotech patent world.355
First is the critical argument that "[p]ublic policy and the [U.S.] Constitutional
objective of promoting technical progress are both advanced when patent
applications are filed as soon as the inventor can provide an enabling disclosure for
practicing an invention. 3 56 Lilly may disrupt the long-standing policy that
encourages prospective patentees to promptly file their patent applications on new
inventions; the public benefits from the prompt filing of applications because new
technology disclosures reach them more quickly.3 57 Due to Lilly's narrow holding
under the heightened written description standard, the filing of genetic inventions
by scientists may be delayed until such prospective patentees have "precisely
determined the corresponding DNA sequences. 358 The precise definition test
articulated in Lilly, and previously formulated in Revel, requires a certain specificity
other than a description of function to satisfy the written description requirement
for claims to genetic material.359 Thus, a scientist who has no present knowledge of
novelty, nonobviousness, and utility. See supra Part 1I.B (examining the three-pronged test for patentability under
United States Patent law).
352. Mueller, supra note 17, at 650.
353. Id. Note that because the USPTO revised interim guidelines were drafted in a technology neutral
manner, broadly encompassing all technologies, they most likely do not violate public policy.
354. See supra note 17 and accompanying text (presenting the various arguments of scholars and
practitioners with respect to Lilly and its likely negative effect on prospective patentees in acquiring gene patents).
355. Infra notes 356,360 and accompanying text
356. Pitlick, supra note 17, at 223.
357. Mueller, supra note 17, at 651. Without this policy of encouraging prompt disclosure of applications,
one could argue that the public may be deprived of life-saving technology, such as pharmaceutical drugs to treat
a life-threatening medical condition.
358. Id. at 651-52.
359. See supra notes 315-17 and accompanying text (demonstrating the application of the "precise
definition" test by the Lilly court).
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the structural aspects of the claimed genus, but does possess the knowledge of what
may result from the experimental use of the gene, will be unable to satisfy the
description requirement, and hence unable to file a patent application until the
scientist has determined the requisite specificity of the gene.
The second policy argument focuses on the premise that a justification exists
for inventors viewing Lilly as "reflecting an increasingly-widening gulf between the
norms of the business and scientific community and those of the United States
patent system.' '36° In Lilly, one with skill in the relevant art-recombinant DNA
technology-most likely would have realized that the UC inventors were
conceptually in "possession" of the human insulin cDNA through the respective
disclosure of the rat insulin cDNA. ' However, UC failed to reap any reward for
its significant scientific contribution to the field under the precise definition
standard of the Lilly court.36 2 Thus, the Lilly court's recent interpretation of the
adequacy of written description support for gene patents demands the granting of
a patent to the first inventor who sequences the particular gene, as opposed to the
first inventor who actually "make[s] it possible to clone a particular gene family.
' 363
As a result, a competing biotech company with a highly efficient cloning and
sequencing team is essentially able to gain the benefits of a discovery "made
possible by the pioneering research of others.' 3 4
Although the USPTO revised interim guidelines do not appear to violate public
policy in general because of the guidelines' broad application to all technologies,
one must remember that the guidelines are in accord with binding legal
precedent,36 including the controversial Lilly decision. As such, the guidelines
arguably have the potential to violate public policy as discussed above with respect
to the patenting of biotech inventions. However, the truth of these sound policy
arguments must be tested in the next couple of years to realize the total cumulative
effect of Lilly on the biotechnology industry.
VI. CONCLUSION
The statutory written description requirement has evolved over the past two
hundred years and remains firmly grounded in the United States patent system.3
Indeed, with such a rich history, the written description requirement continues to
be an integral part of the process for obtaining patent protection of one's invention
360. Mueller, supra note 17, at 652.
361. Id.; see supra notes 302-17 and accompanying text (discussing in detail the Lilly decision).
362. Mueller, supra note 17, at 652.
363. Id.; see supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text (explaining that before a desired protein through
recombinant DNA technology can be produced, the cDNA that encodes the protein must first be cloned).
364. Mueller, supra note 17, at 652.
365. See supra Part V.B.4.a (analyzing the legality of the guidelines in light of Federal Circuit precedent).
366. See supra Part IV (discussing the evolution of the written description requirement over the past two
hundred years of its existence).
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into the new millennium.367 The Federal Circuit's trilogy of landmark biotech
decisions in the past decade have made an obvious mark with respect to the future
of obtaining patent protection for genetically engineered products and the
specificity required for satisfying the written description requirement.368 Having
incorporated the reasoning from these decisions into the methodology of its
guidelines, only time will tell whether the USPTO's efforts will impede the patent
application process for the biotechnology industry. Nevertheless, in deciding future
cases in this area, perhaps the Federal Circuit should keep in mind the philosophy
of Thomas Jefferson, the founding father of the Patent Act of 1793, who strongly
believed that "ingenuity should receive a liberal encouragement. 369
367. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (quoting the written description requirement as codified in
Title 35 of the United States Code).
368. See supra Part V.B.1-3 (discussing the landmark Federal Circuit decisions of Amgen, Revel, and llly).
369. See supra note I and accompanying text (quoting Thomas Jefferson's philosophy for the grant of a
patent) (emphasis added).
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